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The purpose of this study was to investigate the German 
inflation of 1923 and its effects of the financial and social 
structure of that country. 
A survey of the literature on inflation and on Germany 
during the 1913-192*4- period was undertaken.  Particular em- 
phasis was given to the financial and social conditions at 
that time and their relationship to inflation. 
Both the financial and social structure of Germany were 
profoundly effected by the 1923 inflation.  Fixed income ob- 
ligations became virtually worthless, and equities and real 
estate lost a large portion of their value. Social conditions 
including health, education, nutrition, and the moral attitude 
of the citizens deteriorated significantly. 
k 
The Social and Financial Effects 
of the German Inflation 
of 1923 
by 
Thomas H. Clark 
1 * 1 
A Thesis Submitted to 
the Faculty of the Graduate School of 
the University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Master of Arts 
Greensboro 
1975 
Approved by 
Thesis Adviser 
APPROVAL PAGE 
This thesis has been approved by the following committee 
of the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of 
North Carolina at Greensboro. 
Thesis Adviser 
Committee Members 
>—. 
!kzz t<_-*—^A- ^— 4*"""S—! 
Date of Acceptance by Committee 
11 
A CKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to express my appreciation to Dr. Thomas 
Leary and the other members of my thesis committee for the 
assistance they gave me in the completion of this thesis. 
111 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
APPROVAL PAGE  ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS   iii 
LIST OF TABLES  vii 
LIST OF FIGURES  viii 
CHAPTER 
I.  INTRODUCTION  1 
II.  INFLATION  I* 
Introduction  4 
Inflation and the Economy 4 
Distributional Effects  6 
Inflation and Unemployment 8 
Types of Inflation  12 
Speed of Inflation  14 
Theories of Inflation  15 
III.  HYPERINFLATION IN GERMANY   20 
Introduction  20 
The Inception of World War I  20 
Theory Considerations   22 
The War Years  26 
Post War Environment  3° 
Reparations  30 
German Financial Reform  33 
Actions of Governnent that Aided 
Inflation  35 
Ruhr Invasion  38 
The Last Months of Inflation  40 
Reform  4l 
Dawes Plan  44 
IV.  FINANCIAL EFFECTS OF THE GERMAN 
HYPERINFLATION  45 
The German Stock Market   45 
Introduction  45 
Stocks as a Hedpo Against Inflation  ... 46 
iv 503564 
Chapter Page 
The Reasons Why Stocks Did Not 
Provide a Good Hedge Against 
Inflation ......  50 
The Role of Banking in Germany  55 
Savings Banks   59 
Bonds  59 
Revaluation  61 
Housing and Mortgages   62 
Insurance Companies   65 
V.  SOCIAL EFFECTS OF THE GERMAN 
HYPERINFLATION  67 
Health and Living Conditions  67 
Introduction  67 
Clothing and Heating Conditions   67 
Increase of Disease  68 
Health Facilities   70 
Birth and Mortality Rates  72 
Food and Nutrition  73 
Introduction  73 
Decline of Food Production  74 
Food Hoarding  79 
Comparisons of Food Consumption   80 
Eating Habits   85 
Higher Education  87 
Introduction ....  ..... 87 
Student Aid  89 
Living Conditions of Students   90 
University Income   92 
Professional Hardships  92 
University Costs  9^ 
Student Curriculum  95 
Inflation Profiteers  97 
Introduction  97 
v 
Chapter Page 
Establishment of Fortunes  99 
Life Style of Profiteers  101 
General Poverty .....  101 
Increase in Crime  101 
Pawn Shops  105 
Borrowing and Sharing  106 
Moral Attitude  108 
Suicides  112 
VI.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  113 
FOOTNOTES  119 
BIBLIOGRAPHY   130 
vi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table Paee 
1. Index of Currency Circulation in 
Germany  2* 
2. Velocity of Circulation of Money in 
Germany  24 
3. Index of Wholesale Prices in Germany  25 
k.     German War Expenditures, First 
World War  28 
5. Ratio of Taxes to Total War 
Expenditures   ..... 36 
6. German Production of Basic Crops   75 
7. German Production of Meat  77 
8. Soil Under Cultivation in Germany  77 
9. Consumption Levels of Various 
Products  °3 
10. Enrollment in German Universities  96 
11. Enrollment in Technical High Schools   98 
12. Index of the Number of Crimes  102 
13. Convicted Juvenile Offenders in 
Berlin  105 
Ik.    Divorces in Berlin  109 
vii 
LIST OP FIGURES 
Figure Page 
1. The Phillips Curve  9 
2. Relationship Between Unemployment Rate 
and Rate of Inflation  9 
3. Demand-Pull  Inflation     12 
k.     Cost-Push Inflation     13 
5.     The Liquidity Preference Function      16 
VI11 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Inflation has become a subject of deep concern for many 
of the countries in the world today. The United States expe- 
rienced double-digit inflation in 197^ and economists predict 
a continuation of inflation in the future.  In Europe, par- 
ticularly England and Italy, inflation currently has reached 
dangerous levels. Inflation has recently been named by some 
experts as the number one problem in the world today. A 
deeper understanding of inflation and its effects is abso- 
lutely necessary if the problem is to be solved.  To aid in 
such understanding this thesis will examine the most serious 
period of inflation in the twentieth century. This inflation 
occurred in Germany and lasted approximately ten years - from 
August 1914 to November 1923.  It is hoped that by studying 
this inflation and its effects on the financial and social 
structure of Germany a better understanding of our current 
problems will be obtained. 
In Chapter II there is a brief description of the prob- 
lem, the types, and the different magnitudes of inflation. 
Particular emphasis is placed on the effects inflation has on 
the distribution of income and wealth and the important rela- 
tionship between inflation and unemployment. 
There is also in this chapter a discussion of the long- 
standing debate among economists as to whether a small amount 
of inflation is beneficial or harmful to an economy. Finally, 
the main theoretical approaches to inflation are explained. 
Keynesian theory rests on the liquidity preference function 
and its relationship to the investment sector of the Net 
National Product. Monetary theory uses the quantity theory 
of money and the "equation of exchange," MV=PQ, to explain 
inflation. Although different in their approaches, both the- 
ories recognize the importance of the direct relationship be- 
tween the supply of money and Net National Product. 
Chapter III describes the historical period of German 
inflation.  The beginnings of the inflation are discussed 
with emphasis on the outflow of gold from Germany and the 
subsequent ban on the redemption of currency for gold. A 
consequence of this ban was a large increase in the discount- 
ing of Treasury Bills by the government.  This resulted in a 
huge increase in the money supply in accordance with the 
"equation of exchange" the increase in prices. 
Next, the problems stemming from the war are related. 
The huge cost of the war and the subsequent reparations pay- 
ments placed a heavy burden on the financial health of the 
nation.  Government attempts at financial reform and also 
government actions which reinforced the inflation are examined. 
Finally, the steps leading to the stabilization of the mark 
and the stabilization itself are discussed.  The chapter as a 
whole gives a thorough and concise account of the inflation. 
Chapter IV discusses the financial effects of the German 
inflation.  Prices of German stocks declined during inflation 
in contradiction with the generally held belief that stocks 
provide a good hedge against inflation. The reasons why eq- 
uities are believed to be a hedge against inflation and the 
reasons why equities did not provide such a hedge in Germany 
are related.  The other sections of Chapter IV analyze the 
important role of the banking industry in Germany, financial 
instruments such as bonds, mortgages, or insurance, and the 
situation in the German housing industry. 
Chapter V includes a lengthy discussion of the social 
effects of the inflation.  Particular emphasis is given to 
the physical health and well-being of German citizens.  The 
difficulties of obtaining food, shelter and clothing are dis- 
cussed. Additional discussion includes the inflation's ef- 
fect on the educational system, the moral attitude of the 
people and the inflation profiteers.  Chapter V gives a clear 
picture of the extent of inflation's effects on the daily 
lives of a highly educated law-abiding people.  These changes 
which we observe in the German citizens are most important. 
The interpolation of these changes to today's industrialized 
societies, which are much more prone to violence, crime, and 
other unsocial behavior presents a disquieting image. 
CHAPTER II 
INFLATION 
Introduction 
Inflation is defined by Warren L. Smith in his book 
Macroeconomics as a "tendency toward a continuing rise in the 
general level of prices."  Throughout this thesis, this def- 
inition of inflation is used unless stated otherwise. The 
term "general level of prices" refers to some index which 
measures price changes over certain periods of time.  This 
index is, of course, an average of many different price move- 
ments in the economy.  In this index, some price changes may 
be large and others small, some prices may advance and some 
decline. Ultimately, one index number is derived, and this 
index number represents an overall view of the price changes. 
In the United States, the Consumer Price Index, the Wholesale 
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Price Index or the GNP deflator is used. 
Inflation and the Economy 
Economists have long debated the effects which inflation 
has on the economy. Although it is universally agreed that 
rapid inflation is harmful, some economists feel that a small 
amount of inflation is beneficial. During inflation, prices 
of goods are generally increasing faster than the cost of 
producing those goods,  oome business profits are thereby 
favorably affected. With a portion of these increased prof- 
its, some firms will expand their production capacity and, 
thus, further the economic growth of the country. Although 
it is conceded that such adverse effects as redistribution 
of income and wealth occur, those who follow this line of 
reasoning believe the benefits of fuller employment of re- 
sources and greater growth far outweigh any negative effects.-* 
The opposing view labels all inflation as destructive. 
This belief is founded on the assumption that when there has 
been a continuous dose of inflation and prospects for further 
inflation are good, the savings of society will by reduced 
since savers realize that the purchasing power of their sav- 
ings will be smaller in the future than it is in the present. 
In other words, they buy now before prices go up, or they 
shift liquid assets such as savings into tangible assets. A 
consequence of this reduction in savings will be a reduction 
in the funds available for capital accumulation. Since capi- 
tal accumulation is so important to economic growth it is 
felt that anything which reduces it is harmful. 
Another argument against any amount of inflation is that 
even a small amount of inflation over a long period of time 
will seriously disrupt price levels. For example, a three 
per cent annual rise in prices will result in a doubling of 
prices in twenty-three years."5 This change in the price level 
can have severe redistribution effects on the various sectors 
of the economy if it is not correctly anticipated. 
Finally, some believe that slow inflation leads to more 
rapid inflation.  By gradually building automatically in- 
creased wages and prices into their decisions, businesses and 
consumers foster an atmosphere whereby larger and larger price 
increases can occur.  This could eventually lead to galloping 
or hyperinflation which is of course undesirable. 
Distributional Effects 
Perhaps the most disturbing danger of inflation is the 
redistribution effects it has on income and wealth. If all 
prices, wages, and value of assets increased at the same 
rate, inflation would not be a problem. However, these 
prices change at many different rates and cause considerable 
problems for those in certain economic status.  Particularly 
affected are those individuals who live off their accumulated 
savings or retirement benefits and others with fixed income 
levels.  Rising prices cause their costs to increase while 
their money income (interest from savings plans or pension 
check) remains stable.  Due to these factors their real in- 
come falls and consequently their standard of living decreases. 
Recent high inflation in the United States has caused particu- 
lar hardships for the nation's elderly citizens.  Many of 
these people formerly lived comfortably off their savings, 
pensions, or social security incomes.  Now after two years of 
very high inflation, their real incomes have declined signif- 
icantly.  There have been many reports of the difficulties 
this group has in being able to afford only the barest 
necessities of survival. Even food consumption has declined 
significantly in both quantity and quality. 
In addition to their loss of real income, the real value 
of their accumulated wealth which is stated in fixed monetary 
terms decreases. These savings which many have held for 
emergency purposes can now buy much less in terms of goods 
and services.  Consequently, the security once felt by many 
members of this group is now lacking. 
There are other groups in the economy who gain from in- 
flation. Members of this group, businessmen, workers with 
strong unions, and others who receive business profits, many 
times receive incomes which rise faster than the cost of 
living. Additionally, individuals who hold their savings in 
non-monetary assets (real estate, equities, or real goods) 
generally gain since the value of these assets normally in- 
creases along with the price level. 
The impact of this redistribution on a particular group 
depends on the ability of the members of that group to fore- 
see inflation and also on their ability to adjust the makeup 
of their assets. If one could accurately predict the rate of 
inflation, one could move out of the fixed monetary assets 
during inflation and into those assets which will rise in 
value commensurate with the general price level. Even if one 
could predict accurately however, one may be hindered in 
switching his assets to take advantage of his knowledge. 
Savings accounts may be the only savings form available to 
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those of modest means who have little wherewithal to invest 
in the stock or real estate markets.  Such individuals would 
therefore be no better off with their knowledge of inflation 
because of constraints that limit them due to lack of wealth 
or knowledge. 
Inflation and Unemployment 
There is a large body of evidence on the relationship 
7 between inflation and unemployment.   This relationship is 
inverse. That is, the higher the rate of unemployment, the 
lower the rate of inflation.  This relationship is easily 
understood since at high unemployment levels, unemployed 
workers are more likely to accept any employment even if 
wages are low.  If there is a large pool of unemployed work- 
ers, business firms are also much less likely to accede to 
higher wage demands.  Even unions lower their wage demands 
when unemployment is high.  They know businesses will pre- 
sent greater opposition to wage increases, and they are less 
willing to go through a long strike when there are many WOrk- 
ers unemployed. 
When the economy begins to improve and firms begin to 
hire more employees, workers are more likely to demand in- 
creased wages.  Because of shortages of qualified workers, 
businesses will bid up the wages of desirable and necessary 
employees.  Businesses also find it easier to pass along the 
increased cost of labor in times of high employment and pros- 
perous economy.  Additionally, firms do not desire to ,-o 
through a long strike over wages while the demand for their 
product might be high.  Therefore, wages tend to increase at 
a faster rate as the level of unemployment decreases.  In 
times of full employment, other factors of production also 
increase in price as the demand for them increases.  These 
increased costs are figured into the prices of the output of 
business firms, and therefore many product prices are in- 
creased to reflect these costs. 
The relationship between wages and the unemployment rate 
was first observed by a British economist, A. W. Phillips. 
The curve representing this relationship is called the 
Phillips curve and is seen in Figure 1. 
I oL 
Labor Force Unemployed 
(per cent) 
FIGURE  1 
THE PHILLIPS CURVE 
Labor Force Unemployed 
(per cent) 
FIGURE 2 
RELATIONSHIP  BETWEEN 
UNEMPLOYMENT   RATE AND   RATE   OK 
INFLATION 
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According to Figure 1, if the annual increase in the 
wage rate is six per cent, then the unemployment rate would 
be four per cent.  If the annual increase in the wage rate is 
three per cent then the unemployment rate would be seven per 
cent. 
The relationship between the rate of change in the price 
level and the unemployment rate is presented in Figure 2. 
This relationship is based on the Phillips curve, and it is 
10 also inverse. 
To derive Figure 2 from the Phillips curve, certain re- 
lationships must be examined. First the rate of price in- 
crease equals the rate of increase of C, the total cost per 
manhour, minus the rate of increase of labor productivity. 
Second, the total cost per unit of output equals C X M — 0 
where M is the total number of manhours worked and 0 is total 
output. This relationship can be rewritten C — (rr) or the 
total cost per unit of output equals total cost per manhour 
divided by output per manhour. 
It is known that the rate of increase of a ratio is the 
rate of increase of the numerator minus the rate of increase 
of the denominator.  In the previous equation then, the rate % 
of increase of the total cost per unit of output equals the 
rate of increase oi total cost per manhour minus the rate of 
increase of output per manhour.  This information can now be 
applied to Figures 1 and 2. It is assumed that the rate of 
increase of total cost per manhour equals the rat-- ol increase 
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of wages and that the rate of increase of labor productivity 
is three per cent. With this information thus the rate of 
increase in prices can be calculated from the rate of in- 
crease in wages.  Thus Figure 2 is derivable from the Phillips 
curve. 
The location of the Phillips curve is not immutable and 
can shift. Among the more important factors affecting the 
position of the Phillips curve are the education, training, 
and mobility of the work force, and the nature of price ex- 
pectations in the economy. When the education, training, and 
mobility of the work force increase, there is less liklihood 
of labor shortages occurring. Many more workers are thus 
qualified for various positions, and, therefore, the supply 
of available workers is increased.  This will of course hold 
down wage demands and inflation.  In these cases, the curves 
shown in Figures 1 and 2 will shift to the left indicating 
12 less inflation at various levels of unemployment. 
Price expectations also affect the position of the curve. 
If higher inflation levels are expected, workers will press 
for higher wages and firms will increase prices at a more 
rapid rate.  Therefore it can be concluded that as future 
price expectations increase, the curves of Figures 1 and 2 
shift outward.  That is, there will be more inflation at each 
13 level of unemployment. 
These curves are of course simplifications.  One cannot 
merely indicate a level of inflation that. La ft©0«ptab1e and 
12 
look to the curve to see what the unemployment rate will be. 
However, the curves do show the relationships between infla- 
tion and unemployment. Estimations according to information 
provided by such curves are undoubtedly used by government 
Ik 
policy makers and are therefore of vital importance. 
Types of Inflation 
Economists identify two main types of inflation, demand- 
pull and cost-push. Demand-pull inflation is the classical 
type which occurs as a result of too much money trying to 
purchase too few goods or, more technically, when aggregate 
demand exceeds aggregate supply.  This type of inflation will 
typically occur after a war if prices of goods have been 
artificially held down and scarcities of products during the 
war have caused pent-up demand.  This inflation will occur 
when the factors of production are in full use. This can be 
illustrated by the use of the graph in Figure 3. 15 
Real Income 
FIGURE 3 
DEMAND-PULL INFLATION 
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At YQ it is assumed that the economy is maximizing pro- 
duction, that is, factors of production are in full use. 
Since there can be no further goods produced by this economy, 
at YQand PQ the supply function which had previously been 
sloping upward becomes completely inelastic.  Therefore, if 
demand increases from D to D., supply will not increase and 
prices will rise to P. in order to clear the market. Further 
increases in demand will lead to continued higher prices as 
the graph shows. 
Cost-push inflation results in an economy where free 
market forces are by certain means restricted. Large labor 
unions are able to maintain wage levels and even increase 
them in all phases of the economic cycle. Enormous corpora- 
tions account for vast portions of certain markets and are 
able to influence supply and prices by themselves.  These 
forces cause higher prices even though there may be available 
factors of production and demand is not increasing.  The fol- 
lowing graph illustrates cost-push inflation. 
Keal Income 
FIGURE 4 
COST-PUSH INFLATION 
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As you will note, if supply is reduced from SQ to S1 
prices will increase from PQ to P*. This will cause a decline 
in real income to 3fJt If this economy is going to enjoy full 
employment again, an increase in demand to D. must occur. 
This will of course necessitate further increases in price to 
Speed of Inflation 
In addition to these two major types of inflation, there 
are also varying degrees of inflation broken down according 
to the rate of the price increase. At the low end of the 
scale is creeping inflation which is generally defined as 
inflation at a rate of one to three per cent annually.  The 
desirability of creeping inflation has been discussed earlier 
in this paper. More rapid inflations in order of increasing 
rapidity are moderate inflation, galloping inflation, and 
hyperinflation. 
Hyperinflation is defined as inflation in a period where 
17 price increases exceed fifty per cent per month.   Obviously 
this type of inflation is extremely disruptive to the economic 
and social structure of a nation. The normal patterns of be- 
havior in both areas become inoperative. Because of the rapid 
decline in the value of money, currency becomes less accept- 
able as a means of payment for goods or services. Holders of 
cash attempt to reduce their moneyholdings in favor of other 
assets of a more tangible nature.  Eventually, when the pen- 
alties of holding cash are recognized by the great majority 
15 
of a nation's citizens, a peak of activity is reached.  This 
peak is called a "flight from cash." At this time money com- 
pletely loses its function as a "medium of exchange." Immedi- 
ately, as money is received in payment for goods or services, 
it is spent.  As a result the money supply is circulated at 
1 R 
an ever increasing rate.   At its climax, the velocity of 
19 circulation approached infinity. 7    This increase in the ve- 
locity of circulation is in itself extremely inflationary and 
can have a greater effect on prices "than that of successive 
20 issues of paper money."   Also money loses its store of 
value (savings) function and its standard of deferred value 
(loans) function. Eventually bartering takes over as the 
prominent means of doing business. This of course limits pro- 
duction where workers can't be paid in tradable goods. As a 
consequence of this decline in production, hyperinflation is 
normally accompanied by a depression. 
Theories of Inflation 
Inflation can be explained by using either the Keynesian 
or Monetary Theory. While these theories differ considerably 
in their methods, they both arrive at the same conclusions 
concerning the money supply and the Net National Product (NNP). 
21 That is, there is a direct relationship between the two. 
The basis of the Keynesian theory rests on the liquidity 
preference function. This function is presented in Figure 5. 
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FIGURE 5 
THE LIQUIDITY PREFERENCE FUNCTION 
It represents an inverse relationship between the quan- 
tity of money and the interest rate.  That is, with high in- 
terest rates the demand for money will be smaller and with 
low interest rates it will be higher.  The reasoning behind 
this relationship can be explained in simple terms.  If inter- 
est rates are high, there is a tendency for holders of money 
to use their funds for investment in order to take advantage 
of the attractive rates. By investing in bonds or putting 
their money in a savings account, they would earn a return on 
their money. This of course lowers the quantity of money in 
circulation. If interest rates are low, the return on a sim- 
ilar investment is not as great, and therefore money holders 
?2 
would not be as inclined to keep their funds invested.' 
The linkage between inflation and the liquidity prof'or- 
rnce function is made in the investment sector of the GNP. 
17 
For example if interest rates are declining, the costs of in- 
vesting (i.e., business expansion or equipment) is lower due 
to the reduced interest costs. Also the availability of funds 
21 for borrowing is greater. "* Due to these factors, there is 
an increase in investment.  That is, at the same levels of 
NNP there will be higher investment when interest rates are 
lower. This increase in investment will in turn create a 
multiple expansion of NNP. If the economy is operating below 
full employment, this expansion will result in an increase in 
real output.  If the economy is already operating at full em- 
ployment, this upward movement in total demand will merely 
cause increased prices and no additional real output — that 
is, it will generate inflation. 
Monetary theory uses the quantity theory of money for 
its explanation of inflation. The essence of the quantity 
theory of money is the "equation of exchange," MV=PQ.  In 
this equation M is the money supply, V is the velocity of the 
circulation of money, P is the average price level of all 
goods and services, and Q "is the output of final goods and 
ok 
services during the period."   In this equation, PQ equals 
the total amount of money received for final goods and ser- 
vices or NNP during the period. MV equals the total amount 
of money spent on goods and services.  Since in the same pe- 
riod the amount, spent and received for all goods and services 
are equal, this equation always holds true. 25 
18 
For purposes of explanation, we will temporarily assume 
that both V and Q are constant. With V and Q  constant, the 
equation of exchange becomes M*(«)P, where (^) is a constant. 
In this model, therefore, M and P are proportional. That is, 
if the money supply increases, the price level must also in- 
crease at a similar rate.  If the monetary supply decreases, 
the price level will also decrease. 
In a more sophisticated model, both Q and V are not con- 
stants, y, the real output of the economy, fluctuates during 
the economic cycle and V also fluctuates within a small range. 
Between 1920 and 1970, excluding the World War II period, ve- 
locity of circulation in the United States ranged between 2.5 
and 4.5. If Q is held constant, a new equation can be de- 
termined, M=PQ(£), where (^) is constant. Since PQ equals 
NNP, then M=NNP(^).  Therefore the money supply is proportion- 
27 
al to NNP and can be used as an indicator of NNP. 
When the final assumption of V being constant is re- 
leased, the relationship between M and NNP is no longer di- 
rectly proportional.  However, because of the fairly stable 
value of V, it is felt that M is still a good predictor of 
NNP. While the two do not move in direct proportion with each 
other, they do exhibit similarities in movements of direction 
,-v 28 and strength. 
The monetarists, therefore, use the "equation of exchange" 
and its derivatives to forecast periods of price changes.  Re- 
cent research by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis has 
19 
shown a close relationship between short-run changes in the 
29 
quantity of money and short-run changes in NNP. 
Gottfried Haberler in his book Inflation:  Its Causes 
and Its Cures, states "there is no record in history of any 
country having prolonged inflation without a large increase 
in the quantity of money.-3  Historical examples also point 
to a direct relationship between the money supply and the 
price level. For example, when the great importation of gold 
and silver from the Americas occurred in Europe, the supply 
of money increased drastically.  Consequently, prices also 
rose greatly. A similar phenomenon occurred after the dis- 
covery of gold in the United States, South Africa, and Canada. 
The large increases in the money supply in Germany during and 
after World War I preceded the great inflation in that coun- 
try. 
The record of German hyperinflation is examined in the 
following chapter. 
31 
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CHAPTER III 
HYPERINFLATION IN GERMANY 
Introduction 
The best known period of hyperinflation in a developed 
economy occurred in Germany following World War I.  Bresciani- 
Turroni, in his volume The Economics of Inflation, dates the 
inception of the period as beginning on July 311 191^.  On 
that day the Reichsbank, the German Central Bank, suspended 
the right to convert German currency into gold.    This in- 
flationary period lasted until November 15, 1923t when the 
Reichsbank ceased discounting Treasury Bills for the govern- 
ment.   During this period the value of the German mark de- 
clined from h.2  marks per United States dollar, to k,200,000, 
000,000 marks per dollar with the steepest declines occurring 
in the first eleven months of 1923. 
A complete history of this period is much too exhaustive 
an undertaking to deal with in this thesis.  However some 
background is necessary to understand inflation's effect on 
the various forms of savings and wealth vehicles. Therefore 
a summarized history of this period will follow. 
The Inception of World War I 
On June 28, 1914 Archdukr Francis Ferdinand, heir of the 
Austrian throne was assa:. Lnftted by a Serbian Nationalist, 
21 
Gavilo Princip. When the Serbian government refused to agree 
to various demands from Austria-Hungary, the Austro-Hungarian 
Government declared war on Serbia.  Because of the existing 
alliances among the major powers of that period, a large part 
of the world's population was drawn into this war. Germany, 
already allied with Austria-Hungary, joined the conflict on 
August 1. 
In the week preceding Germany's declaration of war, there 
was a strong anticipation that Germany would come to the aid 
of her ally.  Then, as now, in times of stress and uncertainty 
there was a desire by the populace to hold an intrinsically 
valuable item, such as gold, rather than paper currency.  Con- 
sequently, over one hundred million marks in gold were with- 
drawn by German citizens from the Reichsbank during that 
week.^  This figure represented nearly eight per cent of 
Germany's gold reserve, and a continuation of this drain could 
not be tolerated. Therefore, in order to halt the gold out- 
flow, Germany discontinued its policy of redeeming gold for 
currency. 
This action was of considerable importance for, at that 
time, the gold reserves amounted to forty-three per cent of 
the banknotes and demand deposits.35 Removing the link be- 
tween gold reserves and the amount of money in circulation was 
the Key that opened the door to hyperinflation. 
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Theory Considerations 
The removal of the link between gold and the amount of 
money in circulation was followed by the discounting of Trea- 
sury Bills in huge amounts. This practice was continued 
throughout the war and greatly increased as the inflation 
peaked in 1923.  The discounting of Treasury Bills of course 
greatly increased the money supply. As was observed in the 
preceding chapter, according to the "equation of exchange," 
MV=PQ, if M, the money supply, is increased.  P, the price 
level, will increase proportionally if V, the velocity of 
currency circulation and Q, the output of real goods and ser- 
vices are constant. V and Q are, however, not constant in 
the real world, and together they probably served to limit 
the price increase during the war. 
In Germany during this period, V actually declined. 
Bresciani-Turroni states this was due to hoarding of bank- 
notes by Germans during the war, and it reflects the confi- 
dence they had in the mark.3'  Q probably increased somewhat 
during the war since greater production efforts were required 
to supply the German war machine. By the end of the war, 
however, much of Germany's productive machinery was worn out 
and German factory workers were exhausted.  Consequently no 
great differences in Q are expected. The effect of these 
factors on P caused a rise of 2.45 per cent in wholouaDe 
prices during the war.  ".'hi:; at leaHt conM rma that Lho lower 
velocity held down price increases to some extent. 
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The "equation of exchange" is of course not an exact 
predictor. One cannot simply stick in values for three of 
the unknowns and expect an exact result for the remaining 
variable. The equation does, however, give us a good indica- 
tion of which direction and in what magnitude the result will 
be. 
Tables 1 and 2 provide indices of the values of M and V 
throughout the inflationary period. As one can observe, the 
values of each of these factors rose considerably.  By the 
end of October, 1923. M increased 413 times. Velocity had 
increased 17.79 times indicating the efforts of Germans to 
unload their currency as quickly as possible. The signifi- 
cant increases of M and V both point to large increases in 
the price level at some time in the future. 
Q declined in value after the war due to the loss of 
territory, the loss of shipping and railroad equipment, and 
other affects of the reparations. However large production 
increases in the early 1920's offset this decline and most 
likely slightly lessened the upward pressure on P. 
Overall, however, with the great increases in V and M, a 
large increase in the price level was expected according to 
the "equation of exchange." Table 3» an index of wholesale 
prices during this period, valedates the equation predictions. 
Wholesale prices increased 18.7 billion times from 1913 to 
October 1923. Thus, although an exact prediction of the price 
level was not available, both the direction and magnitude of 
the price level did match our expectations. 
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TABLE 1 
INDEX OF CURRENCY CIRCULATION IN GERMANY (1913=1) 
End of 
1914 1.43 
1915 1.65 
1916 2.04 
1917 3.04 
1918 5.^5 
1919 8.26 
1920 13.5 
1921 20.3 
1922 213.3 
1923  (Oct.) 413* 
♦Millions 
Sourcei     Costantino Bresciani-Turroni,  The Economics of 
Inflation   (London,   1937), p.   162. 
TABLE 2 
VELOCITY OF CIRCULATION OF MONEY 
IN GERMANY (1913=1) 
End  of 
1914 .92 
1915 .94 
1916 .87 
1917 .72 
1918 M 
1919 .96 
1920 1.06 
1921 1.70 , 
1922 6.85 
1923   (Oct .) 17.79 
Source t Costantino  Bre;;c-iani-Turroni ,   The Economic;  of 
Inflation   (London, 1937). p. 168. 
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TABLE  3 
INDEX  OF WHOLESALE  PRICES  IN GERMANY   (1913=1) 
End   of 
1914 
1915 
1916 
1917 
1918 
1919 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923   ( Oct.) 
1.25 
1.47 
1.50 
2.02 
2.46 
8.03 
14.40 
3^.90 
1,^74.80 
18.7* 
♦Billion 
Source:     Costantino  Bresciani-Turroni,   The  Economics   of 
Inflation  (London,   1937),   p.   162. 
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The War Years 
During World War I, Germany's financial problems were 
not unique. All major warring powers were forced to spend 
excessive amounts in order to pay for the huge costs of the 
war. Monetary circulation in these countries increased four 
to five times during the war period. These actions were 
predictably inflationary if one relied on the "equation of 
exchange" which was discussed in Chapter II. In fact, by the 
end of 1918 wholesale prices in Germany had risen approximate- 
ly the same amount as in the other billigerent nations. Ger- 
many's wholesale prices increased 2.^5 times compared to 3.53 
for France and 2.30 for England.  The United States registered 
a doubling in prices during this period although they had been 
in the war for only a comparatively short time. 37 
The mark at the end of 1918 was valued at approximately 
twelve United States cents as compared to its prewar value of 
almost twenty-four United States cents.    This decline in 
value was also comparable to the declines registered by other 
major currencies. However, although the financial policies 
of Germany during the war laid the groundwork for the problems 
of the early 1920's, other countries followed similar courses 
and managed to avoid the chaos which Germany suffered. 
In spite of its strength and effectiveness in military 
matters, Germany was for the most part a group of semi-auton- 
omous states until 1919.  With the exception of the military, 
the central government had little power and because of this. 
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the option of central government taxation to finance the war 
was not entertained until the fighting had been in progress 
for nearly two years. 
War expenses for Germany have been estimated at 164.3 
billion marks. Table 4 gives an annual breakdown of these 
expenditures.  The major portion of these expenses were met 
from the proceeds of the sale of war bonds to German citizens. 
These proceeds amounted to 96.9 billion marks or nearly sixty 
per cent of the total cost of the v/ar.  The bonds for the 
most part were issued at a rate of five per cent and were 
perpetual in length.   The balance was provided by several 
other means.  The most important was that the Reichsbank dis- 
counted Treasury Bills for the Treasury. This process in- 
volved the Treasury presenting Treasury Bills to the Reichs- 
bank.  The Reichsbank, after deducting a year's interest from 
the amount of the Treasury Bills, would return the remainder 
to the Treasury in banknotes. As these banknotes were spent 
by the government, the amount of money in circulation would 
increase by that amount.  In this way the Treasury could cover 
. .  40 its deficits. 
By the use of the above means and particularly because of 
the forty per cent of the war expenses financed by discounting, 
the money supply of the Reich increased considerably during 
the war.  The money supply consisted of coins, banknotes, loan 
banknotes, and daily maturing Reichsbank liabilities. Before 
the war these totaled approximately 7.4 billion marks. At the 
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TABLE 4 
GERMAN  WAR   EXPENDITURES,   FIRST  WORLD  WAR 
April  1  to March 31 M Lllions   of Marks 
1914-15 
1915-16 
1916-17 
1917-18 
1918-19 
ACCOUNTED AFTER   1918 
TOTAL 
6,936 
23,909 
24,739 
42,188 
33.928 
32.599 
164,300 
Sourcei     Costantino Bresciani-Turroni 
Inflation   (London,   1937),   p. 
The Economics  of 
67. 
I 
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end of the war the money supply had increased sixfold to kk.k 
billion marks.  If one includes bank money, which is made up 
of deposits in credit banks, the total amount of money in 
circulation increased from 12.3 billion marks before the war 
to 63.5 billion marks at the end of the war.  This increase 
4,1 
is over fivefold.   As can be seen in Chapter 2, an increase 
in the money supply of this magnitude provides consumers with 
the means to demand a greater amount of goods.  Invariably 
this leads to higher prices if the supply of goods does not 
increase at a corresponding rate. Many times, the price in- 
crease is a lagged response, and as a result, is not noticed 
immediately. It can be seen, therefore, that although price 
increases had been relatively mild during the war, actions 
were taken that paved the way for the hyperinflation that 
followed. 
Price controls during the war did limit the amount of 
inflation. The Reich Statistical 3ureau calculated that 
wholesale prices increased 130 per cent during the war accord- 
ing to the legal maximum guidelines.  Black market activities, 
however, were widespread. Goods traded under this system 
were, of course, much more expensive and consequently negated 
the results of the official price survey. Still, at their 
worst, price increases during the war did not approach those 
42 
of 1923. 
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Post War Environment 
Inflation measured by both the exchange rate and inter- 
nal price indices increased at various rates after the war 
and for some brief periods even declined. Much of the fluc- 
tuations in the mark were tied to political changes, both do- 
mestic and international. 
When the armistice was announced on November 11, 1918, 
Germany was in a state of disarray.  The German Empire had 
been replaced by a Republic only two days before the armi- 
stice, and the newly formed government could not effectively 
control the country. Conditions were further worsened by the 
wide spectrum of political parties that were now trying to 
influence the reconstruction of Germany. Leftist Extremists 
and Government forces clashed violently during this period. 
Reparations 
Throughout this unsettled period, the allied nations 
discussed the terms of retribution which they would inflict 
upon Germany. Germany, itself had no part in these negotia- 
tions. The formal peace agreement, the Treaty of Versailles, 
signed on June 28, 1919. proclaimed the Germans solely re- 
sponsible for World War I and heavy reparations were imposed 
on Germany by this treaty. 
Among the more important items were Germany's loss of 
more than an eighth of its land area in Europe and all of its 
overseas colonies. The nurrondered German territory con- 
tained important industrial, mineral, and agricultural regions 
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Alsace-Lorraine and Upper Silesia were mineral rich and sup- 
ported great industrial complexes while Posen and West Prussia 
were major agricultural districts. This land also contained 
ten per cent of Germany's population. ** 
Great amounts of German property, both public and pri- 
vate, were confiscated by Allied powers at the end of the war 
and as a result of the Treaty of Versailles. This property 
loss has been variously estimated at between six and forty 
billion gold marks, or between one and one half and ten bil- 
lion American dollars. An estimate of between five and six 
and one quarter billion dollars has been considered the most 
reasonable.   Although not all of the property that this sum 
represented would have produced income, a large portion of it 
would have.  Total German income and productive capacity was 
therefore reduced by this amount and the country's balance of 
payments suffered accordingly. The value of Q in the "equa- 
tion of exchange" was therefore reduced because of the land 
loss and property confiscations.  These actions had a limit- 
ing effect on prices, other factors being equal. 
Most important of the reparation terms was the actual 
monetary payment required to be paid to the Allies. The com- 
putation of a total payment was a complicated and drawn out 
affair.  Much of the difficulty resulted from the differences 
in attitude toward Germany among the Allied powers. The 
French were still very bitter about the war and wanted to 
squeeze from Germany and her people everything of value.  They 
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desired to break the back of the German nation so that it 
would never rise to its former status of a world power.  The 
French did not want to be threatened ever again by German 
aggression. The United States and England, perhaps because 
they themselves were never actually invaded by German troops, 
were inclined to settle for much less. They desired Germany 
to get back on her feet economically and felt the French were 
extremely unrealistic in their demands. Of course, both the 
English and Americans agreed with the French in the belief 
that precautions should be taken against a resurgence of Ger- 
man military strength. 
The initial reparations figure agreed to by the Allies 
on January 10, 1920 was 100 billion gold marks or twenty-five 
billion dollars. The gold mark was the unit of currency in 
use in Germany before the war.  It had a value of 23.82 Amer- 
ican cents.  During the inflationary period, the gold mark 
was used as a standard of value since the value of the paper 
mark, then in use, fluctuated so greatly.  Not until April 
2?, 1921, was the final figure reached of 132 billion gold 
marks or thirty-three billion dollars. This amount was far 
beyond the capabilities of Germany to pay.  In addition to 
this fixed amount Germany was required to pay twenty-six per 
cent of the total amount received from exports for the fol- 
lowing forty-two years. 
The payment schedule was to start at two billion gold 
marks a year and increase gradually to six billion gold marks 
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a year. The payment on exports was due annually and was ex- 
pected to increase payments by an additional one billion gold 
46 marks per year.   The magnitude of these payments and the 
absurdity of the Allies in setting them this high can be il- 
lustrated by the response of the most famous economic expert 
of that time, John Maynard Keymes. Keymes felt that this 
amount was three times the maximum of what Germany was able 
to pay.   In spite of the harshness of the plan, it was 
approved by the German Government as a result of an Allied 
threat to invade the Ruhr Valley. 
Although Germany was able to meet its first payment of 
one billion gold marks, it became readily apparent that relief 
from the payment schedule had to be forthcoming. Several re- 
ductions and postponements of the payments took place during 
1922. In fact, beginning in September of 1922 and continuing 
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until late in 1924, no cash payments were made by Germany. 
German Financial Reform 
Although German Government efforts to improve the finan- 
cial troubles of the country were feckless, there were several 
notable attempts to increase Reich receipts and balance the 
budget. As previously mentioned, the Central Government's 
powers to raise taxes were almost non-existent in the years 
before the end of the war. The power of taxation was left 
almost entirely to that of the individual stater, ami the cen- 
tral government survived Tor the most part because of thn 
states voluntary contributions to it. 
3* 
With the collapse of the German Empire and the establish- 
ment of the Weimar Republic this procedure was changed. A 
more centralized government was desired and, therefore, the 
power of taxation came under new direction. 
The first major attempt to increase revenues was termed 
the Reich Emergency Act.  This act became effective in Decem- 
ber 1919 and was a tax on all German capital wealth. Although 
in nominal terms this tax represented almost eighty billion 
marks, the real value was only eight billion in gold marks. 
An installment program of payment was introduced in order to 
decrease the burden of payment for the taxpayer.  Because 
taxes were figured in nominal amounts and payments were made 
over a period of years, inflation soon made its presence felt. 
In 1922 the real value of the amounts collected became so 
ii-9 
small that the payments outstanding were cancelled. 
The second major attempt to increase revenues was devised 
by the Minister of Finance, Matthia Erzberger, and became 
known as the Erzberger Reform. These reforms were a broad 
series of taxes on a great number of items. Although at times 
these taxes were complicated in their applications, they were 
very successful in their early years in increasing Reich reve- 
nues.  They remained the basis of the German tax system for 
years to come." 
The third attempt at increasing revenues wa:s a forced 
loan to the government from property ownors in the amount, of 
one billion gold marks.;.  The .Ifectiveness of thir; loan war: 
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lost due to a government concession that the loan could be 
paid in paper marks at a rate of seventy paper marks to one 
gold mark.     Because of the rapid decline in the mark's value 
at that time,   the real value  of the money received from these 
loans was minimal.5 
Despite  these attempts at increasing revenues and putting 
the financial condition of the new republic  in order,   govern- 
ment deficits continued to grow.    By the middle of  1922,   the 
total effect of the Erzberger taxes had been felt and the 
highest percentage of government receipts to expenditures was 
reached.     As can be seen in Table  5»  this ratio reached a high 
of seventy-five per cent in June of   1922.    Because of the de- 
creasing value of the mark and the nominal valuation used in 
the assessment of taxes,   the real value of these receipts be- 
came of smaller and smaller importance.     In the final months 
before monetary reform in November of 192 3,   taxes  covered 
only  one  to  two  per  cent  of government expenses.     Although 
various measures were attempted to adjust the  tax system to 
the  higher rates  of  inflation,   no adequate  remedy was   found. 
52 
Many taxes did not even pay the cost  of their collection.-^ 
These deficits were financed by the discounting of Treasury 
Bills which caused an increase in the money supply and con- 
sequently worsened   the inflation. 
Actions of Government That Aided Inflation 
The Reichs   financing  of deficits  by  the   issuance  of 
Treasury Bills and the adverse inflationary effects of these 
actions have been discussed  previously. 
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TABLE 5 
RATIO OF TAXES TO TOTAL REVENUE OR EXPENDITURES 
June 20 13.^ 
September 20 21.6 
December 20 57.0 
March 21 55.6 
June 21 ^0.6 
September 21 38.3 
December 21 28.0 
March 22 59.9 
June 22 7^.8 
September 22 20.8 
December 22 
March 23 
June 23 
July 23 
August 23 
September 23 
October 23 
November 23 
December 23 
16.8 
1^.3 
9.7 
10.2 
7.1 
2.9 
1.3 
<+.2 
**6.7 
Source 1     Frank D.   Graham,   Exchange,   Prices,  and  Production  in 
Hyperinflation!     Germany,   1920-1923   (New  York,   1930), 
p.   ^0. 
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Another government policy was also substantially debili- 
tating to the mark. This was the very lenient loan policies 
of the Reichsbank and other commercial banks. These loan 
policies also had the effect of greatly increasing the money 
supply.  Businessmen would obtain loans from these banks and 
repay them at a later date with depreciated money. Since the 
amount of the loan was in fixed terms and inflation was ris- 
ing at a rapid rate, many businesses were able to use these 
funds at a very small real cost. Major expansion projects 
were carried out by many companies simply because the cost of 
obtaining funds was so inexpensive in real terms. The extent 
of this policy can be seen by the huge increase in the amount 
of commercial bills and acceptances outstanding which increased 
astronomically from 1.1 billion marks at the end of 1921 to 
ij-22 billion marks by the end of the following year.-'-' 
Bresciani-Turroni attributes the development and contin- 
uation of these inflationary policies to either a lack of 
knowledge of their consequences or to capitulation by banking 
authorities to pressure from those who stood to benefit from 
them.-' 
The reason that these loans were so popular was the com- 
paratively low effective interest rates at which they could 
be obtained.  Before July 1922, the rate was only five per 
cent in nominal terms.  In August 1923. it had been raised to 
thirty per cent and in September 1923. to ninety per cent, 
^hese figures compare to the actual rate of depreciation of 
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the mark of more than three thousand per cent in 1922 and 
several million and billion per cent in 1923.^^ 
Much of the activity brought about by these low cost 
loans was wasteful and only undertaken because the real cost 
of funds was so low. The additional money and demand created 
here of course only accelerated the mark's decline in value. 
Ruhr Invasion 
The beginning of the end of the mark started on January 
11, 1923 with the invasion of the German Ruhr Valley by Bel- 
gian and French troops. This invasion was precipated by 
small defaults in timber deliveries by Germany which were re- 
quired by the reparations agreement. These defaults were 
used as a pretext by France and Belgium to occupy the area. 
The French, convinced Germany was trying to evade her repara- 
tion obligations, felt the occupation was the only way they 
could assure receipt of the total amount of payments. 
The Ruhr was of immense importance to German industry. 
At the time of the invasion, it accounted for eighty per cent 
of Germany's steel and pig iron production and more than 
eighty per cent of its coal production.-" 
Germany responded to this action with a policy of passive 
resistance in the area.  Factories and mines were abandoned 
and almost no work of any kind was accomplished. The French 
and Belgians resorted to bringing in their own citizens to 
work the mines and forcing the- local population to work. 
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This resistance was extremely costly for Germany.     Not 
only did the loss of the vital steel and coal supplies crip- 
ple industrial production throughout the whole of Germany, 
but the additional costs resulting from it were  enormous. 
Payments  to the striking workers were necessary  in order for 
them to eat and live during this period.    Additionally com- 
panies which accrued losses because of the resistance were 
compensated.    Almost exclusively,   these payments were made 
with the proceeds  from discounting of Treasury Bills.-'      Ear- 
lier it was established that this fiscal method was infla- 
tionary. 
Deterioration of the mark occurred rapidly after the 
Ruhr invasion.    At the end of January 1923 its exchange value 
to the dollar was a seventh of what it had been at the begin- 
ning of the month.     Further declines were forestalled for a 
short while but within a few months the decline began again 
By July,   1923,   the exchange rate of the mark had  fallen to 
one hundred and sixty thousand marks to the dollar from a 
January level of eighteen thousand.    By August the exchange 
rate of a mark for a dollar was a million marks. 
By this time  it was clear that further resistance was 
useless.    A  new government was  instituted and  the resistance 
was ordered to stop on September 26,   1923.    Arrangements were 
made for payments  to the Belgians and the French to begin 
again. 
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The Last Months of Inflation 
During the last two months of the inflationary period, 
the rate of inflation increased to unprecedented levels.  The 
rate of exchange for the dollar grew from a million marks in 
the beginning of August to a hundred and thirty billion marks 
(130,000,000,000) by November 1.   By November 20, 1923. the 
official exchange rate of the dollar had grown to four tril- 
lion two hundred billion marks.  The rate on foreign markets 
v/as much worse at eleven trillion seven hundred billion. 
This was the highest rate to be reached. 
During this time economic activity became increasingly 
more difficult. Regular commercial business was stifled, 
factories were closed, unemployment continued to climb, and 
food and other goods needed to sustain life in the cities and 
towns remained scarce. 
The existence of high unemployment during inflation ap- 
pears to refute the direct relationship between employment 
and inflation which was referred to in Chapter 2.  This di- 
rect relationship did hold true until 1923. Before that, the 
number of unemployed was negligible. During 1923. however, 
normal business relationships became distorted. Currency be- 
came increasingly unacceptable which resulted in a return to 
a barter economy and all the inefficiencies associated with 
it.  Also the invasion of the Kuhr in January 1923 greatly 
affected industrial production in the unoccupied area.  The 
Ruhr was of course the most important source of raw materials 
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value of one gold mark or one  trillion paper marks.    Addition- 
ally on November 15,   the discounting of Treasury Bills by the 
Reichsbank was to stop. 
Because of the severity of the crisis in Germany at this 
time, a political base necessary to build a solution to the 
problem was  lacking.     Success of the program was not expected 
even from the designers of the plan because of the reparations 
problem and the extremely unsettled economic and political 
conditions. 65 Hans Luther,  Finance Minister, and author of 
the decree of October 15i   1923»   likened the plan to building 
a house,  beginning with the roof. 
The plan was carried out by the establishment of the 
Deutsche Rentenbank.     The bank was funded with the sum of 3.2 
billion rentenmarks which were backed by agricultural soil 
debts and industrial debts.     The bank was allowed  to issue 
2,k billion rentenmarks,   half of which were issued to the gov- 
ernment and half to be used in making loans to businesses. 
The rentenmark received its value from a guarantee that 
the holder of 500 rentenmarks could convert this  sum into a 
500 gold mark bond.     This bond was to pay interest at a rate 
of five per cent in gold annually. 
Faith by the public  in the new currency was an absolute 
and essential part of the success of the plan.    Except for 
two brief  periods,   confidence  remained  hip;h.     In Uocombor, 
1923,   it appeared that additional rentenmarks would  be issued. 
During this period confidence  immediately declined and 
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inflationary forces began again. This was quickly halted 
though, when the Rentenbank refused to issue additional renten- 
marks. 
A second crisis occurred in the spring of 1924. Liberal 
credit had been extended to German businesses by the Reichs- 
bank after the November 1923 stabilization. These credits 
were issued to forestall a serious business crisis which might 
have occurred due to a shortage of working capital.  These 
credits caused large increases in the money supply.  Recog- 
nizing the dangers of renewed inflation, the Reichsbank cur- 
tailed the liberal credit policies in April of 1924.  Confi- 
dence in the currency was again restored and inflationary 
70 pressures were halted. 
Improvements in the economy were immediate after stabili- 
zation.  Renewed confidence in the currency led to higher em- 
ployment and production and the food crisis In the cities was 
mitigated because farmers accepted currency. 
Employment figures continued to show improvement except 
for a brief decline during the crisis of 1924. Not until the 
summer of 1925 did there occur any serious unemployment prob- 
lems.71 
There were however many areas where improvement, although 
visible, was slow.  Poor health and food conditions continued 
for many.  Additionally the effects of ten yearr; of physical 
and mental privation did not disappear immediately.  As a 
whole, however, conditions improved steadily and Germany grew 
prosperous. 
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With the return to more stable and profitable times, 
government income grew and a balanced budget was achieved. 
This fact,, along with a temporary discontinuance of repara- 
tions payments, provided further assistance toward improving 
confidence in the currency. 
Dawes Plan 
During the months after stabilization, a committee 
chosen to look into the reparations problem presented a new 
plan for reparations payments.  This plan provided for reduced 
reparations payments in the first years and allowed Germany 
the necessary time to recover from the economic crisis it had 
just experienced. No total amount of reparations payments 
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was ever established under this plan. 
The Dawes Plan was approved by both Allied and Axis 
countries and was put into effect on September 1, 1924.  This 
plan allowed Germany to recover from the hardships she had 
73 endured. J
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CHAPTER IV 
FINANCIAL EFFECTS OF THE GERMAN HYPERINFLATION 
The German Stock Market 
Introduction 
Although prices on the German stock exchanges fluctuated 
greatly during the inflationary period, they ended in 1923 
significantly lower than they were ten years earlier. From a 
base of 100 in 1913. the stock index adjusted for wholesale 
prices declined to 21.2? by December 1923.  This is a decline 
of almost eighty per cent in ten years. Although this was 
certainly a significant decline, prices had been much lower 
in the previous year.  In October of 1922, the index reached 
a low of 3.6*4-, which was a decline of over ninety-six per cent 
from 1913. 
The large decline in share value during this period con- 
tradicts the generally held view that stock ownership pro- 
vides an effective hedge against the loss of purchasing power 
due to inflation.7** The term "hedge" refers to the process 
of trying to avoid or mitigate a loss ty making offsetting 
investments.  In this case, investors used stock ownership to 
eliminate or lessen the real losses caused by the rapid and 
continual decline value of the mark. 
There is some dissension with the position that stocks 
do provide a reliable heu«e against inflation, bisarreement 
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is centered around several points. First a company's depre- 
ciation reserves may be inadequate for replacement of worn 
out buildings and machines.  Inflation, of course, increases 
the cost of capital goods whereas the reserves are based on 
preinflation costs.  During inflation there is normally a 
significant gap between the two figures.  Second, real wages 
may actually increase, due to the pressure of strong labor 
unions.  In this case, all other things equal, real profits 
would decline.  Third, and perhaps most importantly, inves- 
tors may become disenchanted with all financial investments. 
Stocks would be avoided in favor of physical goods.  This, in 
fact, did occur during the German inflation. 
In spite of these reasonable arguments, the position fa- 
voring stocks as an inflation hedge is much stronger. Most 
authorities in this area abide by this position. The follow- 
ing section will present support for this case. 
Stocks as a Hedge Against Inflation 
The reasoning behind the belief that stocks provide a 
good hedge against inflation is sound.  Corporations are heavy 
borrowers of funds.  These borrowed funds are generally used 
for expansion purposes when accumulated profits and deprecia- 
tion reserves are not adequate.  As a general rule, the amount 
of debt of a company is larger than the amount of liquid as- 
sets held such as cash, account:; receivable, etc.  When a com- 
pany is in this position, it --an be called a "net debtor." J 
During inflation, the real value of the company's liquid assets 
^7 
will decrease. On the other hand, the real burden of its 
debt will also decrease.  If the company is a "net debtor" its 
overall financial position will improve as inflation continues, 
In as extreme a case of inflation as Germany's, the debts of 
many companies were totally wiped out.  The final result was 
that a company might emerge from the inflationary period in a 
much improved financial state.  Investors would normally place 
more worth on the company with the stronger balance sheet and 
purchase more shares. This would drive up the price and thus 
provide a hedge against inflation. 
Lenders tried to protect themselves by charging higher 
rates of interest on their loans. These rate increases were, 
however, held down by the Reichsbank's policy of granting ex- 
tremely large business credits on short-term, low interest 
bills.  This resulted in interest rates never being able to 
provide adequate protection against the continuing rapid in- 
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creases in the inflation rate. 
As indicated earlier, many businessmen borrowed funds at 
this time simply because the cost of the funds was so cheap. 
Even at the height of inflation when the actual rate of depre- 
ciation of the mark was several million and billion per cent 
the loan policy of the Reichsbank and other major lending 
institutions provided for charges of only thirty to ninety 
77 per cent.'' 
A second reason behind the belief that stocks provide 
inflation protection is that during inflation profits of 
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corporations generally rise.  Profits and prices of stocks 
are directly relatedi  this would again substantiate the be- 
lief that stocks provide inflation protection.   Profits rise 
during inflation for several reasons. First, wages typically 
79 lag behind increases in prices.   That is, businessmen are 
more atuned to the economic environment than the average 
worker.  The businessman will have already increased the price 
of his product before the worker realizes that his real wages 
are diminishing.  By the time a wage increase can be bargained 
for, prices will have risen further and the worker is once 
again one step behind.  This can be shown by the significant 
decline of real wages of German workers from 1913 to 1923. 
Salaried workers' real income dropped thirty-two per cent, 
skilled workers' fifty-three per cent, and unskilled sixty-six 
. 80 per cent. 
The purchase of raw materials also provides a means by 
which profits can be enlarged.    Typically raw materials are 
bought in bulk for use  in production weeks and sometimes 
months before the actual sale of the final product.     In rapid 
inflation the cost of the raw materials  in a product may be 
many times higher by the time the product is sold.    Even 
though the actual cost of the goods in the product are  com- 
paratively low the  sale of the product will reflect current 
production costs and conditions.    Therefore in rapid inflation 
the actual  costs   of  raw materials   in a   product  may  be  very 
small and  would  allow relatively  large   profits   for   the  pro- 
ducer. 
»9 
Complementing the above,   the purchaser of raw materials 
is normally given an amount of time,   typically thirty days, 
before his payment comes due.     In a period of rapid inflation 
the purchaser will be paying his bill at the end of the thir- 
ty day period with money that is worth substantially less 
than it was when the bill was issued. This  further de- 
creases the  cost of goods and allows greater profits for pro- 
ducers. 
Other business  costs such as  interest charges,  rent,  and 
taxes were also considerably reduced by the effects of infla- 
tion.     In more severe  inflation the  fixed payouts of business- 
es, although remaining unchanged  in nominal terms, are  reduced 
in real  terms.     In Germany,   these payments were reduced   to 
insignificant real amounts in the early 1920's.     The  cost of 
taxes  in such  times  is also substantially reduced.     There is 
normally a delay between the time  the taxes are calculated 
and when they are paid.     This was true in Germany and many 
businessmen waited until the  last possible moment to pay their 
taxes.     Once again the nominal amount of taxes would remain 
the same but the  cost  in real terms would be reduced substan- 
tially because  of the declining value of the mark. 
The rents  of factories,   stores,   and other places of 
business  were   fixed  in Germany during  the   inflationary  period 
due  to  governmental  rent  controls.     Consequently,  as   the   value 
of the mark declined,   the burden of rent payments did also. 
Eventually  these  costs  became  an insignificant  real  expense 
of business. 83 J 
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A final reason supporting the belief that stocks are a 
hedge against inflation concerns the relative amounts of 
stocks or bonds that an investor might hold. During infla- 
tion bonds and mortgages which provide for a fixed return 
over a period of time become unattractive.  The purchasing 
power of this fixed return becomes less and less as inflation 
continues causing holders of bonds to suffer real losses. 
For this reason, holders of fixed income bonds and mortgages 
try to sell these assets. With the proceeds of these sales 
they want to buy something which will offer protection from 
inflation losses. Stocks are among the most popular choices. 
This increase demand for stock by former bondholders conse- 
quently drives the prices of stocks higher. 
The Reasons Why Stocks Did Not 
Provide a Good Hedge Against Inflation 
There are many theories why stock prices declined so 
drastically in Germany during the inflation.  Perhaps the 
most cited reason was the loss of confidence by the popula- 
tion.8^ The shattering defeat in World War I and subsequent 
harsh penalties imposed by the Allied powers had an extremely 
depressing effect on a people who viewed their nation as supe- 
rior to all others.  This loss of confidence very naturally 
extended into the long-term prospects of business concerns and 
even into the ultimate survival of the German nation.  Concern 
over the direct effects of the reparations was also a factor. 
Many Germans believed that all or most of this extremely large 
J 
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sum would eventually have to be paid. Ultimately the means 
of raising this sum would be through taxation and other aus- 
tere measures. Business firms would provide a significant 
percentage of this amount. Because of the enormity of the 
total reparations, it was felt business firms would be bur- 
dened for many years to come. Thus net profit and dividend 
payouts would be curtailed making ownership of these shares 
less attractive.  These factors assuredly diminished the de- 
mand for stocks during various periods in the inflation and 
caused an overall depressing effect on the prices of stock. 
Much of the investment funds, which normally would have 
flowed into the domestic stock market, were used for the 
purchase of foreign exchange. In this way those who were 
concerned with the prospects of Germany hoped to be able to 
hedge against total disaster in the future. 
As mentioned previously, more specific instances of in- 
vestor loss of confidence occurred throughout the inflation 
period. An example of this occurred during the early months 
of 1922 when share prices fell rapidly. Until December of 
the previous year increases in share prices and the deprecia- 
tion of the mark had moved together for some time. Those who 
were relatively inexperienced in investing, and there were 
huge numbers of these, had supposed that the inverse relation- 
ship between share prices and the depreciation of the mark was 
infallible. They felt assured that they had found a way to 
protect themselves from inflation. When this relationship was 
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severed in December of 1921 and sharp declines in the share 
index adjusted for the wholesale index occurred, many inves- 
tors lost the confidence they had once felt in investing in 
stock. Consequently when prices began again to decline in 
early 1922, many investors sold their holdings in fear of 
much lower prices.  This was a type of self-fulfilling proph- 
ecy and share prices declined rapidly until the latter part 
of the year. 
Another explanation of depressed stock prices during 
the inflationary period was the meagerness of declared divi- 
dends.8  A theoretical method of stock valuation bases the 
present value of a particular issue on the discounted value 
87 of the company's future dividend.   Therefore, with dividends 
during this time at a relatively low level, stock prices 
merely reflected this situation. 
Profits of many companies were still high during and 
after the war. For example, during the fiscal year 1920 to 
1921, a group of thirteen large iron and steel companies had 
a net profit of 383.6 million marks.  In spite of these large 
profits the companies paid out only 160 million marks. 
Profits as a whole were not as great as before the war. 
In a study of 1^58 Germany companies during the year 1921 it 
was found that net profits equaled 3.0*+ per cent of capital 
(share capital plus published reserves) compared to 10.55 per 
cent in 1913. Bresciani-Turroni states however that these 
figures are suspect due to the practice of companies distorting 
- 
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reported profits during inflation. Therefore these findings 
89 are not to be relied on too heavily. 7
Another example of the low dividend payout was provided 
in a study of 120 companies.  The dividends paid by these 
90 companies resulted in a yield of 0.25 per cent.   This was 
hardly enough to interest potential investors. 
A major cause of the low dividend payout during this 
time was the inflation itself. Because profits of a company 
are normally earned over a continuous period of time, and 
dividend payouts occurred on a quarterly basis, large portions 
of the profits would accumulate until the payout date of the 
dividend was reached. Although these accumulated profits were 
invested on a short-term basis, the rapidity of the inflation 
always caused a loss of real purchasing power. For this rea- 
son many companies decided to use their profits for investment 
in real goods and thus a reduction of dividend payouts oc- 
91 curred. 
Although reinvestment of profits in a company is general- 
ly wise and will result in increased profits in the future, 
many investors were more interested in more immediate benefits 
of dividends.92 There were those of the "rentier class" whose 
entire income was the dividends they received.  For these peo- 
ple the sale of their stock holdings became necessary because 
of the small real return on their investments. Other small 
investors did not fully understand the intricacies of the sit- 
uation and these investors unloaded their shares in an effort 
to get a higher return elsewhere. 
5^ 
The   "forced"   sales  by  the  above  groups  depressed  stock 
prices.     The more astute and wealthy began buying up large 
blocks  of shares at  these low prices and  many large  concen- 
trations  of wealth were   initiated  by  this  method. 
Many times after control of a company was gained by 
purchase of low priced  shares directors of the company would 
vote themselves special fees as directors.    This would com- 
93 pensate for the  low dividend payout. 
Other  reasons   for   low share   valuations   include   the  peri- 
odic scarcities of money and the problems   involved in analyz- 
ing financial records of companies that were expressed  in 
paper marks.     These records presented a complex and,  at times, 
impossible  task of adequately analyzing a  company's  financial 
situation.     During the  later stages of the inflation,   some 
asset values expressed  in a balance sheet were virtually use- 
less.    For example,   the Dresdner Bank  issued a balance sheet 
for December 31.   1923.     It had valued certain physical assets 
including buildings,   its  share  in a  number  of valuable  syndi- 
cates,   its  shares  of  other banks  and  its  other stock   holdings 
at one  trillion paper marks each.    At the  going exchange rate 
9^ 
the total  indicated  value was one United States dollar. 
Another  example  concerns  the Deutsche   Bank.     In  1913   its 
capital  was   valued  at  two  hundred  million   gold  marks.     By  1923 
it was   valued  at one  billion   rive   hundred   million  paper marks 
which war,  worth  less   than  on*  United  Stater;  cent.     On   the   la:;.. 
balance  sheet  in paper marks,   a  capital amount was  not  even 
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95 included.   J    These examples give some  indication of the hope- 
lessness of trying to assess  the value  of a company through 
its financial records.    Because of the risks inherent in pur- 
chasing something which cannot be valued many investors simply 
did not buy these shares. 
Most likely all of the above cited reasons  contributed 
to the low stock market valuations during the inflationary 
period.    The loss of eighty per cent registered by the adjust- 
ed stock index is certainly not a profitable return for an 
investment hedge.     On the other hand,   when one considers  that 
by holding alternative investments of fixed income assets or 
simply cash,   one would have  lost everything.     Therefore  invest- 
ing in the stock market did provide a partial inflation hedge. 
The Role Of Banking In Germany 
The German banking system differed from its counterparts 
in other advanced industrialized countries.    It was a combina- 
tion of a commercial bank, an investment bank and an invest- 
ment trust.96    It also fulfilled the function of a brokerage 
house. 
German banks played a large part in the rapid  industrial- 
ization of Germany in the late  1800's.     They were the main 
97 financiers behind a great many companies.        When functioning 
as investment banker,   they would purchase huge blocks of 
stocks and bonds and then attempt to place them with the pub- 
lic.     This naturally resulted   in holding sizable  inventories 
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of stock in various companies. These holdings gave banks 
significant weight in the decision processes of companies in 
which they held stock.  In addition to the holdings in their 
own portfolios, they also were allowed to vote the holdings 
98 of their customers.   This gave them additional power to 
enforce their guidance on other companies. 
The investment banking function was considerably more 
risky than the more traditional banking business. For this 
reason German banks needed a large capital base. A typical 
prewar German bank would have capital reserves and undistrib- 
uted profits equal to twenty-five per cent of deposits and 
other liabilities." These funds provided the German banks 
with enough backing to participate in such a wide variety of 
undertakings. 
The German banks lost considerably during inflation. 
Until 1920 Germans tried to offset the inflation by increas- 
ing the amount of their savings.10'  After that, they realized 
their real savings were diminishing faster than they could be 
replaced. They therefore stopped putting money in their sav- 
ings accounts and spent any extra income. The banks lost al- 
most all their deposits by the end of 1923.  The situation 
was such that authorities stated in the beginning of 192^ that 
"The banks, for all practical purposes might have been new 
institutions dating from the stabilization of last November 
and merely beginning to attract customers." 
Along with all other business concerns the hank:-, had to 
issue balance sheets and other financial statement* valued in 
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gold marks as of December 31» 1923. This was required because 
the financial statements issued in paper marks had become com- 
pletely worthless due to the effects of inflation. As stated 
in the stock market section of this thesis, assets of immense 
real value were given paper mark values which translated to 
less than a dollar in United States money. Other companies 
102 left out a capital section altogether. 
The gold balance sheets were not simply the paper bal- 
ance sheet figures converted into gold values.  Rather they 
were entirely separate valuations of assets, liabilities and 
103 capital items. 
The issuance of the gold balance sheets displayed what 
had happened during inflation. The banks showed a loss of 
both paper mark capital and prewar capital. This was because 
of the issuance of additional stock during the inflation and 
also because of a loss of portions of the original gold cap- 
ital.10* 
Although banks were more conservative about issuing addi- 
tional stock than other business concerns, they still had to 
reduce their gold mark to paper mark capital on a I1IO.3 
scale. This compares to a li3^.3 scale for gas and water com- 
panies. When comparing the 1924 gold capital to 1913 gold 
capital, the ratio was It3.3. This was a loss of seventy per 
cent of capital from 1913 to the end of 1924. 
These losses were the result of their large holdings of 
paper marks and large amounts of outstanding loans. Cold 
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capital was lost because banks lent out portions of this money 
and received payment in depreciated marks. Banks attempted 
to protect themselves by various measures to reduce these 
losses, but everything failed in the face of increasing infla- 
tion.106 
Some of the measures taken to stem inflationary losses 
were as follows. First, there was an increase in the rates 
of interest charged on loans. By the fall of 1923 the inter- 
est charge had risen to forty per cent per day. This was 
still inadequate because of the even faster rate of deprecia- 
tion of the mark. Second, loans would be valorized by requir- 
ing loan payments to be equal to the original gold value of 
the loan.  Third, before the restrictions of the Foreign Ex- 
change Decree of October 12, 1922, any money not loaned out 
would immediately be invested in foreign exchange. These 
actions mitigated the losses taken in the final inflation 
years, but by that time much of the damage had already been 
done.10? 
Although the assets and capital accounts were considera- 
bly reduced because of the inflation, banks' financial stabil- 
ity was not impaired because of an offsetting reduction in 
their liabilities. The position of banks in the business en- 
vironment was, however, diminished due to the great losses 
inflicted by inflation.  The great industrial concerns, which 
emerged Trom the Inflationary period relatively unscathed, 
replaced the banking industry ac the most powerful force it, 
German industry. 108 
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Savings   Banks 
Savings banks were an important factor in the German 
banking system.     In these  banks  the majority of individual 
Germans deposited their savings.    As a group the savings  banks 
109 held more deposits than all  the commercial banks  together. 
In 1913  the amount of marks on deposit was   19,689,000,000 or 
nearly four and seven tenths billion dollars. These de- 
posits were for the most part used as a source of funds   for 
the mortgage  market.     By  the  end  of  inflation  the  real  value 
of these  funds  had been reduced  to an insignificant amount 
and savings banks  had no part in the  loan markets  in 1924-. 
After stabilization the savings banks again came  into more 
general  use and   eventually  regained   their  former  status. 
Bonds 
As with all other fixed return investments, bonds depre- 
ciated greatly in real value during the inflation. The extent 
of the decline can easily be seen by a brief example.  For 
instance, if a ten thousand mark bond was purchased in 1913. 
its value in dollars would have been approximately two thou- 
sand five hundred dollars. If it was issued with a five per 
cent interest rate, the owner would receive five hundred marks 
or one hundred and twenty-five dollars a year in annual inter- 
est.  By July of 1922, the real value of this bond had dimin- 
ished to twenty dollars and its interest to one dollar per 
annum. By January of 19?3. the dollar valu<> of the bond war. 
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fifty-five cents and the annual interest less than three cents. 
After January the mark fell at such a rapid rate that the bond 
was virtually worthless. Thus the many people who held bonds 
lost their total investment if they held them throughout the 
inflation period. 
Bond holdings were very large in Germany.  In World War 
I alone 96.9 billion marks in bonds were sold to the German 
112 .     . . public to pay for the war.    These bonds in addition to 
those already outstanding before the war brought the total 
amount of government bonds outstanding to two hundred billion 
marks at the end of the war.113 The real value of these bonds 
was negligible by the end of 1923. Large amounts of indus- 
trial bonds were also outstanding. These bonds too lost their 
value just as rapidly as government bonds. 
Efforts were made to stabilize the value of bonds but 
only after great damage had been done. Some of these attempts 
involved making the bonds repayable in goods rather than mon- 
ey.  One of the first agencies to make such an attempt was the 
State of Oldenburg. A debenture was issued in denominations 
of one hundred and twenty-five kilograms of rye. At redemp- 
tion one hundred and twenty-five kilograms plus twenty-five 
kilograms as earned interest were to be repaid.11  The Baden 
Electricity Supply Company issued bonds in kilograms of coal. 
Denominations of 500, 1000, 2000, and 5000 kilograms were is- 
sued for a total of 1,200,000,000 marks.  The purchase price, 
interest, and redemption price were calculated on the price 
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of Westphalian bituminous flaming coal IV.     *    Other bonds 
were  issued in electricity,   potash,   cement and many other 
products. 
Because of the large financial losses suffered by many 
bondholders  there was considerable pressure on the government 
to take some action that would somehow reimburse those with 
losses.    The government held to the principle  that a  "mark 
was a mark"  throughout the inflationary period.    Not until 
the last few months  of 1923 did this stance change.     The cir- 
cumstance which initiated the change was a Supreme Court de- 
cision that the  inflation had caused a violation of good 
faith. In several different legislative bills a procedure 
for revaluation of bonds and mortgages was established. 
Revaluation 
The revaluation took  form through the passage of two 
bills.     First the Decree of February 1^,   192^ reimbursed 
owners of mortgages and corporate bonds.    New instruments 
were issued in amounts of fifteen per cent of the nominal 
value  of the  bond.     If  the  bonds  or mortgages  had already been 
paid off these  laws did not apply.     Savings bank deposits and 
life insurance  obligations were revalued at a lesser rate. 
Holders of government bonds were exempt from the laws until 
all the war reparations   had  been paid.    These provisions did 
not satisfy   the   public.     A;;  a  consequence  more   liberal  stan- 
dards  were  passed   on July   16,   1925.     In this   law   the amount 
of revaluation for mortgages was increased from fifteen to 
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twenty-five  per cent.     If a mortgage was paid off in the last 
year of inflation the  owner was entitled to some degree of 
compensation. Corporate bond revaluation remained at 
fifteen per cent but public bonds were revalued.     Basically 
this revaluation amounted  to five per cent of the  face value 
of the bonds;   however,   a special provision enabled  certain 
holders,   picked by a lottery,   to receive up to twenty-five 
per cent.     This provision placated many holders who felt that 
119 a five per cent revaluation was  too small. 
The  revaluations  were  some  relief for  those  who  had  been 
cheated out  of their wealth by the  inflation.     This relief, 
however,   provided only a fraction of the value of the origi- 
nal amount and served only to mitigate the extreme losses of 
wealth. 
Housing And Mortgages 
In 1913   the  value of the mortgages outstanding  in Germany 
was estimated at sixty-five billion marks or about one-sixth 
of total German wealth.    Approximately one-fourth of this was 
in rural property and the remaining three-fourths  in urban 
property.120    The great bulk of these mortgages were worthless 
ten years  later.     Inflation had reduced the burden of this 
debt  to a   pittance  along with  the  value  of   the  mortgages. 
The  elimination  of all  mortgage  debt was a   very   favorable 
occurrence   for property owners.    Mortgages which normally 
would have  taken years  to pay off could now be  terminated by 
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the payment of only a fraction of a day's wages.     Paying off 
a property mortgage was  of course beneficial to all property 
ownersj   however,   other effects of inflation offset this ad- 
vantage for some  owners and even caused disastrous conse- 
quences for others. 
Farmers and family home owners were the particular 
beneficiaries of the  inflation while those who owned rental 
property,   whether apartments,   homes,   or stores suffered. 
Farmers actually prospered under inflation since  they no 
longer had mortgages to pay and they were able  to receive 
high prices for their agricultural products.    An owner of a 
house who did   not desire   to sell it benefited by the elimina- 
tion of his mortgage.     Of  course the homeowner suffered from 
high prices and the other adverse inflation effects,   but, at 
least,   his home was secure. 
Those owning rental property also had their mortgages 
eliminated,   but the loss of the real value of their rent re- 
ceipts more than offset this advantage.     In Germany there was 
a large middle  class who owned income property.     Many lived 
solely from the   income produced from this property.     Before 
the war the  income  from house rentals was approximately five 
billion marks.121     As   inflation progressed   this   sum represented 
less and  less  real purchasing power.    During the  early  1920's 
the real  value  of rent had   shrunk to almost nothing.    Thus 
this  large  group  of  rentiers  suffered  a   huge  loss   of  real   in- 
come  due  solely   to   the  effects  of  inflation. 
6^ 
The cause of this dilemma was a government regulation 
which placed a ceiling on rents based on prewar rent charges. 
Most rents had reached their limit early in the war and fur- 
ther increases needed in the following years to offset the 
122 decline   in the marks value were illegal. Even the  cost of 
the normal repair of housing was much greater than the return 
from the property.     Consequently many buildings  fell into a 
state of disrepair. 
With the return from rents nominal,  many owners of rental 
property were forced to  sell their property to pay for living 
expenses.     This invariably decreased the prices  of houses. 
As an example a Berlin town house was  sold in 1914 for four 
hundred  thousand marks or approximately one hundred thousand 
dollars.     In 1923 the same building sold for four hundred mil- 
123 
lion marks  or about  five hundred dollars. 
Because of these low prices there was a great influx of 
foreign buyers  in the German real estate market.     Speculation 
became  rampant with sales  of  the  same  property  occurring some- 
times several times  in a week.     In all major cities  foreigners 
owned blocks  of buildings   in downtown areas.     For  instance   in 
Berlin nearly one  half of the apartment houses in residential 
sectors were owned by foreigners.     In Wiesbaden,   in the French 
occupied  area,   twenty-eight  per cent  of   the  buildings  wero 
foreign owned. 
This   trend  ended  after   Lhe  stabilization  of  the  mark   in 
November  1923.     With mor-   normal  economic  conditions,   rcrnl 
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estate ownership again became a long-term proposition. Rent 
regulations were still in effect and an adequate real current 
return could not be expected. Prices declined again as for- 
eigners sold what they had bought in previous years. Within 
12«! 
a few years most of the houses were again in German hands.  ** 
During the inflation there was an extreme shortage of 
housing in urban areas.  In spite of this condition, little 
new housing was constructed. New housing was not under rent 
control. The costs of building these new units were very 
high and in order to make them profitable, very high rents 
had to be charged.  Few Germans could pay these prices and 
1 ? f\ 
consequently few new houses or apartments were built. '   A 
ration system was used in order to allocate the available 
housing.  There was normally a waiting time of years before 
many families received adequate shelter.  In the meantime 
they lived in inadequate areas with numerous families crowded 
into the same living quarters. These conditions caused many 
of the health and social problems of that period. 
Insurance Companies 
Germany had a very well developed system of private in- 
surance with coverage for accident, sickness, old age, welfare 
and unemployment. Millions of Germans received coverage under 
these plans with both the worker and employer contributing to 
pay the cost. 
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Before the war these private companies had capital assets 
127 of five and one half billion marks.    These funds were al- 
most completely dissolved by the effects of inflation. Iron- 
ically, laws enacted to protect these funds helped cause this 
catastrophe.  The laws required insurance companies to invest 
only in mortgage loans on land and in government securities. 
These investments because of the fixed nature of their return 
became worthless as the value of the mark fell.  Although this 
law was amended in July 1923 to provide for investment in 
other areas, the great majority of assets had already been 
128 lost. 
Inflation,   therefore,  wiped out the social benefits of 
millions of Germans.     These benefits had been paid for by 
years  of work by Germans and had been counted on to provide 
help in times  of need.     The loss of these benefits had much 
to do with the German sense of hopelessness during these 
times.     The loss of the assets of these companies during in- 
flation also wiped out an important source of mortgage  funds 
in the   capital market.     The insurance companies did not re- 
cover for many years after stabilization. 
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CHAPTER V 
SOCIAL EFFECTS  OF  THE GERMAN HYPERINFLATION 
Health And Living Conditions 
Introduction 
The   health  of  the  German people was  severely  damaged  by 
the  effects  of  the   inflation.     One  observer commented  on 
health conditions of children in the following manneri 
From infancy to school age marked rickets  is so com- 
mon, anemia,   listnessness,  poor muscle tone,   sunken 
eyes and emaciation so generally seen that one  loses 
a sense  of proportion and is  inclined to underestimate 
the extent of the depreciation of vitality which is 
almost everywhere obvious among the children of the 
wage earner,   the lesser public officials and the 
twenty to forty per cent of the adult population who 
are unemployed.13° 
The prime  factors which caused the damage were an inadequate 
diet,   insufficient clothing and heating,  and lack of cleanli- 
ness.    The dietary and food conditions during inflation will 
be discussed  in another section. 
Clothing and Heating Conditions 
Clothing and heating conditions were poor for a great 
majority of Germans during inflation.     The cost of these ne- 
cessities  had risen too high in relation to current income. 
Since  the cost of food was so high there remained  very little 
money for other necessities.    A magazine  correspondent depicts 
the  situation as  follows: 
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The children or a great number of them have no under- 
clothing. Many boys go about with just two garments, 
a coat and a pair of trousers. Where the coat does 
not fit tightly, you see bare skin. The girls have a 
jacket, skirt, stockings, and boots or shoesj the 
little babies in their charge are in rags,131 
Another reports that seventy-five per cent of the children in 
132 
Munich need shoes. 
The clothing situation was equally as bad for adults. 
To preserve their pride, outer garments were in good repair 
even though quite worn. Undergarments were however, in rags 
and could be mended no further. 
Warmth in the home and schools was lacking. In spite of 
the cold winters in Germany, many homes were not heated at 
all. If heat was present in a home it usually was confined 
to one room of the house. At school the class room tempera- 
ture was kept near sixty degrees. 
These conditions caused an increase in pneumonia and 
rheumatism in the population.13^ It also helped to lower the 
resistance of Germans and made them much more susceptible to 
other disorders. 
Increase of Disease 
Uncleanliness had never been a problem in prewar Germany. 
The Germans had in fact been regarded as overfastidious in 
their personal habits. Much of this was changed due to the 
privations caused by the war and inflation. Diseases caused 
by uncleanliness such as eczema, impetigo, scabies and louse 
infection became very common.  Uncleanliness was a result of 
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a lack of soap,   a lack of warm water, and unclean or missing 
underwear.     The  closing of a great many public baths and over- 
crowded sleeping areas added to the problem.   "    The great 
lack of adequate  housing caused overcrowded living conditions 
for many.     Families of eight to ten in number were at times 
forced to sleep in the same room.     Children who had contagious 
diseases of one type or another would be forced to sleep in 
the same bed with other uncontaminated children.    A   lack of 
bed clothes and linen also added to the unsanitary condi- 
tions.1-3      The old linen was completely worn out and  there 
was no money available to replace them. 
Other diseases such as tuberculosis,   typhus, scurvy and 
rickets became very common during inflation.     Because of the 
lack of milk and other foods and sunlight,   the occurrence of 
rickets was almost universal in children.    Most of the chil- 
dren recovered after the dietary deficiencies were corrected. 
However some  suffered these dificiencies for too many years 
with the result of permanent bone damage.     Lack of vitamin 
rich foods and unsanitary eating habits caused increases in 
scurvy and typhus. 
Tuberculosis was also quite common.    In some German 
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towns,   one out of every four children had this disease. 
In a study of health conditions in eight large German cities, 
Dr.  Haven Emerson,  a New York physician,  found that forty-six 
per cent of two  to six year old children gave a positive reac- 
tion  to  the  Von  Picquet  test.     This  test  indicates  those  who 
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are infected with tuberculosis but the disease is still in an 
138 inactive stage. 
In the following paragraph, Dr.  Emerson states the rea- 
sons for  the great  increase   in tuberculosis  in Germany. 
Unemployment,  accompanied by a total loss of all sav- 
ings and insurance and   investments of a lifetime,   on 
top of nine years of a much restricted diet for all. 
agesj   inability to pay for private care and hence dis- 
regard or conscious neglect of precautions during the 
early stages  of tuberculosisj unavoidable crowding 
into small,   dark,  damp,  unheated living rooms of a 
multiple of chronic bacillus carriers to whom fell the 
lot of tending the little children while all the rest 
went out to try to earn or gather foodj   prolonged in- 
tense exposure  to tuberculosis of even little children 
already seriously depressed by early severe rickets 
and the accompanying bronchial infections of the cold- 
er weather and with a resistance  lowered by a diet of 
potatoes,  meal vegetable oil, and a quite inadequate 
ration of milk of a low grade of butterfat.i->y 
Health Facilities 
Many of the  causes and consequences of the poor health 
conditions  could have been mitigated if proper facilities 
such as  hospitals,   child care centers,  disease detection cen- 
ters and other similar facilities were available.     In fact, 
Germany at one  time had very good  facilities of this type, 
but because of the  inflation a great many had to close or cut 
back on services.     In Berlin,   one-half of the nurseries and 
one-sixth of infant homes had to close because  of increased 
cost.1/+0    Also,   in Berlin,   five tuberculosis detection centers 
with room for four hundred patients closed due  to lack of 
funds.     Several  public and private   hospitals with beds for 
several thousand patients had  to close  for the same reason. 
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Of the  children's  facilities in Berlin,   seventy-three per 
cent of the day-nursery centers,   twenty-four per cent of the 
kindergartensj  twenty-eight per cent of the children's shel- 
ters and thirteen per cent of children hospital beds were 
closed because of lack of funds. In another city ninety- 
three kindergartens  closed and three thousand children who 
were to go to a center for the treatment of rickets did not 
go because the  center closed.     In Prussia twelve per cent of 
the hospitals   closed in 1922. 
Of the hospitals that remained opened, many no longer 
replaced  the linen or made necessary repairs to the facili- 
ties.    The v/ards were overcrowded and understaffed.    Necessary 
medical equipment v/as not available and medicine had become 
too costly to prescribe.    The heatinr: of the building had be- 
come a major expense with the cost of coal increasing from 
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six to ten per cent of the budget to fifty per cent. 
The  condition of those admitted to the institutions  that 
remained opened was  noticeably different from pre-inflation- 
ary times.     Babies  brought to  charitable  institutions for 
care were wrapped in newspapers rather than diapers. Many 
patients because of lack of money avoided going to a hospital 
until they absolutely had to.    Many were beyond help when 
they arrived.    An indication of this is the fact  that thirty 
per cent of hospital deaths occurred on the first day of ad- 
mission and many more within the first three days.     Only those 
in the  top ten per cent income class were able to pay their 
bills.     Others had to rely on charity. 
1^5 
72 
Birth and Mortality Rates 
Birth and mortality figures were also effected by the 
inflation and the resulting increase in poverty of the popu- 
lation.     In non-inflationary periods the birth rate had been 
approximately thirty births per thousand.     During inflation 
146 the rate  had  fallen to  fifteen per thousand. In the large 
cities births  fell from 302,000 to 285,000 in the  1921 to 
1^7 An increase in abortions  occurred during 1922 period. 
this time.     Desperate  families could not afford to have any 
.... lW more children. 
In addition to a lower birth rate,   the mortality rate 
for the newborn was greater.     This was a result of the ema- 
ciated condition of many of the pregnant women and less pre- 
natal care.     New mothers were unable  to nurse their young as 
long as they once  had.     During the inflation the length of 
nursing was only a few weeks versus six months or more nor- 
mally.     Also  the amount of milk given while nursing was about 
one-half of that previously given.1 9    These factors undoubt- 
edly influenced the health and viability of the newborn.     In 
Munich,   comparison of infant mortality figures give a vivid 
view of the worsening situation.     In 1922,   only twelve per 
cent of newborn babies  diedj   the following year during the 
most advanced  stages of  inflation forty per cent of newborn 
babies died. 150 
The overall mortality rato also increased during  the 
latter stages  of inflation.     In towns over one; hundred 
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thousand, the rate increased from twelve and six-tenths to 
thirteen and four-tenths per thousand. During the same time 
period the mortality rate for the whole country increased 
from twelve and one-tenth to twelve and eight-tenths. Many 
deaths were reported to be caused by old age or weakness but 
the main cause was mostly hunger. 151 
Pood And Nutrition 
Introduction 
Germany was always a large food importer even in years 
of good harvest.     It is estimated that one-fifth to one-third 
of her food requirements had to be imported in the years be- 
fore the war.1^2    Broken down into major categories,   fifteen 
per cent of its grain had to be imported,   thirty-five per 
cent of its meat and fifty per cent of its fats and dairy 
products.153    The population of the country was simply too 
large  in comparison to the amount of fertile,  tillable land. 
During the war the Allied Powers initiated a very suc- 
cessful blockade of German ports.    Germany was,   therefore, 
effectively cut off from any imported food supply.    This, 
combined with the fact  that many who were  formerly engaged  in 
production of food were now in the armed services,   caused 
serious   food  shortages   in Germany.     In  1915  the  government  de- 
creed   two meatless days a week as a result of  the  food   short- 
ages.     Later ration cards became necessary.     In the last years 
of the war,  milk was extremely scarce.    Only expectant mothers 
7^ 
and very small children were  siven any and the amount they 
received was  very little. Although it was  officially de- 
nied by German authorities,   a report from the Health Office 
in 1918 stated that  there was acute  famine during the war as 
a result of the blockade.     It was estimated that nearly eight 
hundred  thousand civilians died during the war from starva- 
tion and resulting complications. 
At the end of  the war and the lifting of the blockade 
the situation improved somewhat.    However,   improvement was 
not rapid and it did not last  for long.    A  year after the war 
had ended a health survey based on medical examination found 
that in many factory towns  there was not one woman from the 
working class who weighed over one hundred pounds. As  in- 
flation grew worse so did the   food situation.     Undernourish- 
ment and  starvation were  major  concerns   for most  urban dwell- 
ers. 
Decline of Food Production 
There were various reasons for the food shortage.    First, 
food production was significantly below prewar levels.     Table 
6 presents the production of basic crops  in the vears  1913. 
1921,  and   1922.     All   categories  show a  decrease  during  these 
periods.    Wheat and rye which are  the basic   ingredients of all 
German bread  show a decline of over fifty-one por conl.   from 
1913   to 1922.     Production of  potatoes,   one of  fcho stable; of 
the  German  diet,   decline.!   fro;-,   fifty-four  million   ton:;   in 
1913  to  twenty-six million  tons in 1921. which was also a 
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TABLE  6 
GERMAN  PRODUCTION  OF  BASIC  CROPS 
Rye 
Wheat 
Summer barley 
Oats 
Potatoes 
1913 
Tons 
12,222,394 
4,655.956 
3.673.254 
9,713.965 
54,121,146 
1921                 1922 
Tons                Tons 
6,798,638    5.349.091 
2,933,820    1,895.723 
1.938,995    1.581,367 
5,004,983    4,130,780 
26,151,380 
Decrease  from         Decrease   from 
1913 to  1921           1921  to  19?-? 
Rye 
Wheat 
Summer  barley 
Oats 
Potatoes 
(56.3)< 
(59.3) 
(56.9) 
(47.2) 
(51.8) 
(11.3)96 
(35.4) 
(18.«0 
(17.5) 
Source 1     Sir  Philio  Dawson,   Germany's  Industrial  Revival 
(London,   1926),   p.   70. 
76 
decline   of over fifty-one per cent.     In Table 7 meat produc- 
tion for  the first quarter of 1913 is  compared to meat pro- 
duction for   the first quarter of 1921.     Sharp declines in 
output can also be seen here.     Total meat production in the 
1921 period was only forty per cent of prewar levels.    Milk 
production was also reduced significantly resulting in seri- 
ous milk shortages   throughout the inflationary period. 
The   situation grew worse in the following years.     In 
1923 it was  estimated  that grain production would decline 
twenty to   twenty-five per cent from the previous year of poor 
harvest.157    At the end of 1923 it was estimated   that Germany 
produced  only twenty-five oer cent of her prewar  food output. 
There were numerous reasons why German food production 
declined so drastically.    One of the ma.ior factors was  the 
decline  in the amount of land under cultivation.     Table 8 
compares the number of hectares  in production for various ma- 
jor crops   in  the years   1913 to 1922.     In 1913 there were 
1^.752,963  hectares   (2,471 acres per hectare)   under cultiva- 
tion.     By  1921.   there were 10,155,523 hectares and in 1922 
only 9,982,899.     This  is a decline of 4,770,000 hectares  or 
over thirty-two per cent in the amount of cultivated soil 
from  1913   to   1922.     Of  this  amount,   2,435,624  hectares   had 
been ceded to various other countries under the surrender 
terms of  the war.     The remaining 2,300,000 hectares or 6,000, 
000 acres  were  removed  from production because  of  economic 
considerations.159     The  Gorman government  had   initiated  a 
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TABLE 
GERMAN   PRODUCT 
7 
[ON OF MEAT 
Beef 
Veal 
Pork 
Lamb 
1,980,000 
379.000 
3.458,000 
9^,000 
862,000 
185,000 
1,231,000 
40,000 
5,911.000 2,318,000 
Source*      Werner  Sombart,   "German  Standards  of Living,"  The 
New Republic,   XXX   (May 24,   1922),   362. 
TABLE  8 
SOIL   UNDER   CULTIVATION   IN  GERMANY 
Winter wheat 
Summer wheat 
Winter rye 
Summer  barlev 
Cats 
Potatoes 
Sugar  beet 
1913 
1,488,971 hectares 
214,698 hectares 
5,219,78? hectares 
1.383,?98 hectares 
4,925,993 hectares 
2,839.393 hectares 
450,592  hectares 
1922 
1,185,664 hectares 
187,435 hectares 
4,078,941 hectares 
1,152,030 hectares 
3,202,324 hectares 
2,720,834 hectares 
417,019 hectares 
Source 1     Sir Philip Dawson,   Germany's   Industrial  Revival 
(London,   1926),   p.   63. 
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series of price  controls on various  crops. These  controls 
diminished  the  profits  the  producers would receive and there- 
fore diminished their incentive  to plant adequate acreage. 
The result was an extreme  shortage of food. 
A   second reason for the decline  in food production was 
a decline in the productivity of the  land under cultivation. 
In 1913 wheat yielded ninety bushels  per hectare.    In 1921 
this  yield  declined   to  seventy-six bushels  per hectare  and  in 
1922,   fifty-two bushels per hectare.     This   is a decline of 
over forty-two  per cent from 1913 to   1922.     The yield  for rye 
was seventy-seven bushels per hectare  in 1913i   sixty-four 
bushels   per hectare  in 1921, and fifty-two bushels per hect- 
are  in 1922.     The declines  in the yield of oats were similar. 
In 1913 oat yield per hectare was  one  hundred and fifty-four 
bushels.     In 1921  the yield was one hundred and   ten bushels 
and in 1922,   ninety bushels.161    This was also a decline of 
forty-two per cent in the  1913 to   1922 period. 
A   decline  in the use of fertilizer and a reduced effort 
on the part of the farmers are reasons cited for this  de- 
cline.162    One  of the most important fertilizers,  Thomashehl, 
was  in very short supply.     This resulted from a lack of  iron 
ore needed to produce  it.     The necessary iron ore had  previ- 
ously  come   from  the  province  of Lorraine which  had  been  coded 
to France  after  the war.163     The  decline  in worker  productiv- 
ity was most  likely a result of the ceilings placed on   the 
prices  of most agricultural  goods  and   the  low morale  of   the 
worker. 
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Another reason for the decline in output per hectare v/as 
the Door weather conditions in 1922. Much of the decline in 
output witnessed that year was blamed on a poor growing sea- 
son. These conditions were apparent throughout Europe and 
caused major production reductions in the other major coun- 
tries. 
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Food Hoarding 
A second reason for the food shortage was the hoarding 
of available foods by farmers. Even  while people were starv- 
ing in the German cities, German farmers had huge stockpiles 
of food on the farms.  The farmers had decided to withhold 
large amounts of storable food from the markets because of 
the rapidly declining value of the mark. In earlier years, 
they had watched the decline of the value of the marks they 
received from their harvest. They no longer wanted to ex- 
change their valuable food supplies for paper that they felt 
would be worthless in a short while. Therefore, they held as 
much food as possible off the market. They would 
tions of it if they needed to buy something the same day or 
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if they received gold or a foreign currency in return. 
Because of these peculiarities, the farmers were a compara- 
tively properous group at. this time.  The healthy condition 
of the farmer can be seen in the following description of a 
train ride from Munich to Berlin.  This took place at a time 
when much of the urban population was starving. 
Three peasants boarded the train at a small village 
just outside of Munich and entered my compartment. 
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At noon they ate   their lunch - larre  hunks of bread, 
a whole  ham,   a long liver sausage, a dozen hard 
boiled eggs and two apples a  piece.166 
A   third  reason for the shortage of food was the poverty 
of a large portion of the  German population.     Even though 
there was food available,   many could afford only the barest 
necessities.      It  is  estimated   that  ninety  per  cent  of  the 
average income  of a working family was spent on basic food 
167 requirements. This   food  was   inadeauate  with respect  to 
both amount and nourishment, and many people suffered from 
malnutrition.     A   foreign  correspondent  reported  on  the   food 
situation in 1923.     He said 
I never passed a baker's or green grocer's shop in 
Berlin without noting crowds gathered around the 
windows   gazing wistfully at  fresh  vegetables and 
bread.160 
Comparisons   of Food Consumption 
Comparisons  of food  consumption  in  prewar  years   to   food 
consumption in the inflationary years show how critical   the 
shortages were.     Before   the  war German milk   consumption aver- 
aged a pint a day.     During the latter years  of inflation,   the 
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average  in major German  cities  was  under one-tenth  of  that. 
Only expectant and nursing mothers and  children under two were 
allowed  any milk at all.     Even  if milk  was  available,   it was 
extremely  expensive.     It was  estimated  by  the Municipal  Child 
Welfare Department in Munich that the cost of the rationed 
milk  allowance   for  three   children would   be  equal   to   twenty   to 
thirty  per cent  of  the   income  of   a   laborer  or  clerk. 
170 
81 
3ecause  of the shortages and  the high cost it was  estimated 
that since  1914,   children over four years old had  had no milk 
at all.     There was also nothing available at that  time  that 
would qualify as an adequate  substitute so many of these 
children suffered permanent physical damage because of the 
. .     171 scarcity. 
Meat consumption also declined substantially during in- 
flation.     In  1913 annual  meat  consumption was   114  pounds  per 
capita.     By  1923 consumption had  declined by over fifty-six 
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per cent to fifty-one  pounds per capita. Not only did 
the amount of meat consumed decline but also the auality of 
the meat.     During the   inflation years  the  consumption of 
beef,   pigs,  and sheep declined, while  the  consumption of 
horsemeat and  dogs   increased.     In  the   fourth quarter of  1921 
there were   1,416.051   pies  killed.    A year later in the   fourth 
quarter  of  1922,   1,1*1,1*6  pigs were  killed   or a  reduction of 
twenty  per  cent.     On  the   other hand,   the  number of  horses 
killed  in  the  same   time  period  increased  nearly   fifty-five 
per cent from 30.967 to ^7.652.    As  the  intensity of the in- 
flation  increased   in  1923  pork  consumption again declined. 
Somewhat surprisingly  horse  consumption declined  also.     Ap- 
parently  this   substitute  meat  had   become   too  expensive  also. 
The  consumption  of  dog meat,   however,   experienced  sharp   in- 
creases,     in  the   third  quarter of  1921.   1.090 docs  were 
slau,htered.   in  the   thirn  quaver  of  1922.   3.678.   and   in  the 
third quarter of   1923.   6.430.     This   is  an  increase   of noarly 
five hundred per cent  from 1921  to 1923. 
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Consumption of many other products fell alow; with milk 
and acceptable meat products.     In Table 9,   consumption levels 
of sugar,   beer,   tobacco,   coffee,  and  sub-tropical  fruits  are 
shown.     For all categories  except sub-tropical  fruit prewar 
statistics were not available.    A meaningful comparison can 
be made,   however,   by using post-inflation figures.     This will 
give a  comparison of consumption in inflationary and non-in- 
flationary  periods.     Sugar   consumption averaged  292,000  tons 
a quarter in 1923 and by  1927  it had risen to  396,000 tons or 
an increase of over thirty-five per cent.    Thus,   consumption 
of sugar steadily increased after the   inflation.     Before  the 
war Germany was a large exporter of sugar.     In 1913 she had 
produced  2,700,000  tons   of which she   exported   1,100,000  tons. 
By the early  1920's she was  barely producing enough for her 
own needs.     Price controls and labor problems contributed to 
17^ 
the decline in production. 
Beer consumption was also depressed during the   inflation 
period.     In  1922  and   1923  beer  consumption was  8,012,000 and 
6,567,000 hectoliters a quarter respectively.     By 1927 con- 
sumption  had  climbed  to   12,436,000  hectoliters  a quarter. 
This   is  an increase  of almost  ninety  per  cent  from  1923. 
Coffee and   tobacco  consumption also  exhibited  startling 
increases  after  the   inflation  ended.     Coffee  consumption  rrew 
particularly rapidly from 9,682 tons a quarter in 192 3 to 
31.175  tons  a  quarter  in  1927.     This  was an  increase  of over 
two   hundred and  twenty  per  cent.     The  comparatively  low  level 
TABLE  9 
CONSUMPTION   LEVELS  OF   VARIOUS   PRODUCTS 
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(a)   Consumption of  Supar   (tons) 
 1921 1922 1923 
First auarter 
Second  quarter 
Third  quarter 
Fourth  quarter 
First quarter 
Second  quarter 
Third  quarter 
Fourth ouarter 
283,994 
316,868 
292,161 
1+23,363 
192 5 
296,505 
337,092 
395,24? 
378,341 
353,171 
345.811 
332,230 
389,049 
295,503 
355.384 
405,017 
409,093 
346,003 
254,028 
309,063 
261,727 
1927 
313.421 
3^8,752 
473,324 
'4-40,682 
1924 
166,344 
193,599 
298,959 
387,823 
First quarter 
Second  quarter 
Third  quarter 
Fourth  auarter 
(b)  Consumption of Beer* 
(thousands  of hectrolitres) 
First  quarter 
Second  quarter 
Third auarter 
Fourth  quarter 
1921 
5,807 
8,352 
11,267 
6,764 
1925 
8,662 
12,900 
14,1U 
10,187 
1922 
7,182 
9.862 
9.439 
5,566 
1926 
9,951 
12,407 
14,461 
11,213 
1923 
5.646 
8,026 
8,560 
4,038 
1927 
9,994 
13.427 
15,231 
11,094 
•Production plus  net   import; 
1924 
5.685 
9.807 
10,605 
8,442 
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(c) Consumption of Tobacco (tons) 
1921       1922       1923 
First ouarter 
Second auarter 
Third quarter 
Fourth quarter 
29,5*1 
22,731 
37.385 
25.035 
192 5 
First quarter 26,968 
Second  quarter 30,085 
Third  quarter 38,331 
Fourth auarter 23,858 
26,483 
39,846 
23,183 
21,120 
1926 
24,108 
29,021 
31.340 
32,583 
19,855 
21.055 
18,614 
20,448 
1927 
28,792 
32,211 
33.190 
32,759 
1924 
26,932 
22,130 
24,752 
27.957 
(d)   Net  Imports  of Coffee   (tons) 
 1922     1923 1924 
First quarter 
Second  quarter 
Third  quarter 
Fourth quarter 
First quarter 
Second  quarter 
Third  quarter 
Fourth auarter 
13,364 
8,212 
11.566 
3.650 
1925 
2 5,648 
18,884 
28,383 
17,420 
7.37 5 
12,877 
6,7?7 
11.751 
1926 
32,128 
20,987 
30,685 
20,998 
9,950 
11,660 
15.079 
18,621 
1927 
39,953 
24,085 
36,310 
24.353 
(e) Consumption of Sub-tropical Fruits (tons)  
1913 
1920 
1921   (May-December) 
1922 
1923 
298,579 
79,144 
58,440 
52,006 
43,917 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
300,766 
379,892 
386,928 
42 0,541 
Source.     Costantino  Bresciani -Turroni,   The_ Jiconomics_of 
Inflation  (Londm,   1 '31),   P.   456. 
^ 
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of coffee consumption in the inflationary period is under- 
standable since  coffee provides no nutritious substances for 
the body.    With the need for nourishing foods so great for 
the masses of Germans,  non-nourishing foods were naturally 
eliminated first from their diet. 
Fruit consumption in the early 1920's showed a rapid de- 
cline from prewar  1913.     In 1913,   there were 298,579 tons of 
fruit consumed in Germany.     By 1923,  consumption had declined 
to ^3,917 tons,   or a decline of over eighty-five per cent. 
Four years later,   consumption had climbed to 420,5^1  tons,   or 
an increase of over eight hundred and fifty per cent.     The 
sharply reduced levels of fruit consumption in the early 
19?0's constitute an indication of the extremely high prices 
of fruit during the inflationary period. 
Eating Habits 
The great reduction in the consumption of various  foods, 
of course,   resulted  in alterations in the eating habits of 
millions  of German families.     Many families necessarily con- 
sidered  two meals a day sufficient.    These meals   consisted  of 
fried potatoes for dinner and boiled potatoes for supper.     The 
normal diet for a working class family was black  corn coffee, 
dry bread,  and coal potatoes with herring brine.     Among the 
working and middle  class,  many  children  never went   to  bed 
175 without being hungry. 
During this period of time, many surveys of eftting habits 
were  taken  in  the   schools.     It was  found   that  children were 
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being fed an excess of carbohydrates in place of an adequate 
diet of protein and fat. In the city of Chemnitz,   1,300 
schoolchildren were surveyed during the last stages of infla- 
tion.    Of these,   four hundred had no breakfast at all,   nine 
hundred had only a piece  of dry bread for lunch, and one 
thousand had an inadequate meal the previous night.    Many of 
the children had not eaten in twenty-four hours.    In Magede- 
burg,  twenty per cent of all children did not receive any 
hot  food all  day.     Throughout Germany  there  were many reports 
177 of school children fainting in class because of lack of food. 
Patients  in public and private  hospitals before  the war 
had received approximately 2,500 grams of meat and 230 grams 
of fat a week.     In 1923 they received 600 grams or approxi- 
mately twenty-one  ounces  of meat and 500 grams  of fat a week. 
The consumption of milk had been reduced to a pint and one- 
178 
half a week versus  two quarts before  the war. 
As   expected,   the  effects  of  this adverse  change   in  the 
German diet were not good.    One-sixth of all school children 
were estimated   to have some form of hunger disease as anemia, 
defective  rlands,   or goiter.179    The average  weight  of  boys 
from  the  ages   of  six  to  fourteen was  almost  eight  pounds  un- 
der  the   prewar  norm.     Girls  of  the   same age  averaged almost 
five  pounds  below  the  norm.     For ages  nine  to  thirteen   for 
both boys and  girls   there was a  thirteen pound decrease   in 
average weight   from  the  prewar  norm.1'30     In Dresden,  a   medi- 
cal  exam  Of  1.528  students   Indicated  an average  weight  of   ten 
_.A 
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per cent less  than the average weight of a prewar student of 
1 81 
the same age.    In a study of thirteen year olds in 1922 in 
the city of Annaberg, boys were on the average almost three 
inches shorter than the 1913 average and girls were slightly 
1 ft? 
more than two inches shorter.     '     In physical development,   it 
was estimated that boys were on the average at least two years 
behind prewar levels and girls a year and one-half.    Many 
children were much worse.     In the mind of one observer one 
little girl who appeared  to be only four years  old was actual- 
ly ten.     Another group of boys who were thought to be between 
six and eight years were actually between eleven and fourteen. 
This retardation in growth was not from disease but from mal- 
nutrition. 
Because of malnutrition and general physical weakness up 
to twenty per cent of children applying to school in some 
areas were refused admittance. There was also a lack of phys- 
ical endurance in gym classes and mental attentiveness in 
class because of undernourishment. 
Outside help was given by foreign countries and voluntary 
organizations like the Quaker relief fund. The situation was 
so critical however, that these philanthropic groups only made 
a slight improvement in overall conditions. 
Higher Education 
Introduction 
The German love for learning is renowned.  German univer- 
sities were among the best in Europe and higher education was 
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aspired to by the  great masses of the middle-class population. 
Inflation severely disrupted the existing state  of affairs. 
The number of students enrolled in universities was not 
adversely affected by inflation,  but the way of life of the 
student and his professors was significantly altered.    En- 
rollment did not decline during the early 1920's mainly be- 
cause  the  cost of student tuition remained stable in nominal 
terms.     Consequently, with the value of the mark declining so 
rapidly,   the cost of tuition in real terms became increasingly 
smaller.    Eventually the  cost was insignificant. 
Although the   cost of tuition was insignificant,   the stu- 
dent still had many other costs such as books,   housing and 
food which were not insignificant.     The increases in these 
costs  caused  considerable difficulties for the student.    All 
but the very rich had to find employment to support themselves 
during this period.     Until  the middle of 1923 employment was 
available for most  students  due to the stimulus of inflation 
on the  economy.     Most of these  jobs were manual labor and 
paid barely enough to make   it worthwhile for the student. 
Many students worked a full eight-hour day in addition to go- 
ing to classes.     The necessity of work and  the normal class 
load of study eliminated the non-academic part of the student 
life which was most enjoyable.    Those traditional activities 
of students as  "serenading,   drinking bouts,   bonfires and 
rough-housing"  had all but disappeared from the German uni- 
versity scene. 186 
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Student  Aid 
In spite of  the large number of students working,   it 
seems unlikely that many could have remained in school with- 
out outside help.     This help came from several sources,   the 
most important being The Studentenhilfe,   or cooperative soci- 
eties,1 The  Studentenhilfe  was organized  by  students   in 
response   to the  increasing cost of living.    It aided students 
in mar.y different areas by providing goods and services at 
substantially lower prices.     Food,  heat,  and housing were 
available at one-fifth to one-tenth of the normal cost. 
Small businesses such as bookbinding shops,  shoe  shops,   ho- 
tels, and general stores,  were projects gradually undertaken. 
These services were run by the students and therefore provided 
1 ftfi 
jobs as well as reduced costs. 
The  costs of  the various  projects  of The Studentenhilfe 
were reduced by contributions  from local merchants,  churches 
and farmers i  although in the latter stages of inflation these 
contributions were greatly reduced.    Foreign contributions 
were also received  in support of the program.    Costs were kept 
down by the use  of student  labor.     To qualify for the benefits 
of The Studentenhilfe a student was required to work  two days 
a semester without wages  in one of the  various programs.     If 
the  student  did  not  complete  his  service  his   privileges  wero 
taken away.     This   possibility was  naturally avoided  by   the 
189 students with preat care. 
Other  sources  of  help  for  the  students  were  provided  by 
the generosity of  the  citizens  in university towns.    Many 
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housewifes would aid students by providing free laundry ser- 
vice.     Some would also mend their clothes.    When food was 
available,  students would be invited to Sunday dinner.     These 
dinners were often the only adequate meal of the week for 
students. 190 
Living Conditions of Students 
In spite of the generosity of various groups and the 
great success of The Studentenhilfe,  many students suffered 
greatly during the inflation.     The physical strain of working 
full-time and also attending school contributed to a deterio- 
ration in the health and resistance of the student.    When 
combined with the inadequate diet and improper clothing and 
shelter of the great majority of students,  many suffered. 
Tuberculosis among students  increased substantially during 
this  time. 
A  common view of the poor conditions  experienced by stu- 
dents was  expressed in the Education Review in 1924. 
Recently three students were discovered in an attic 
room,  with no bed,  with a single  candle for both light 
and  heat and   just enough money to buy one good meal a 
day.     So every day one of the three dined like a king 
on the meager fare of the mensa  (cooperative  boarding 
house)  and then returned to bread and water for the 
next two days while his companions took their turn. 
All three were  trying to earn their way.1*1 
The  students  were  not  the  only  ones adversely  effected 
by  the   inflation.     University  professors and  scholars  suffered 
rreatly at   this  time.     Salaries  of educators,  although  high 
in prewar years,   became inadequate as   inflation progressed. 
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Increases  in compensation were given but they did not offset 
the loss  in buying power caused by inflation.    During 1922 
nominal salaries were increased seven to eleven per cent but 
192 prices increased sixty to seventy per cent.   w      Professors 
had to find additional work merely to keep themselves and 
their families supplied with the necessities of life. 
The salaries of professors did not increase as  fast as 
many other sections  of German society.    According to Albert 
Einstein in a  letter  to The New Republic,   in 1922,   scholars' 
and teachers'   income had been reduced to twenty per cent of 
its prewar level.  **    At a university extension school a pro- 
fessor would be paid fifty marks for a two hour lecture. 
This would barely be  enough for the professor to buy dinner 
that night.    An authority in a certain field would be paid 
19^ 
only three hundred marks for a signed article. At the 
June 1922  exchange rate this equaled approximately one United 
States dollar.     The working class was organized and was able 
to pressure larger wage gains  from businesses.    Scholars and 
professors had no similar organizations and,   therefore,   had 
to be  content with what was offered them.     There was a good 
reason why their wage  increases had to be kept comparatively 
small.     This was because the budgets of the universities were 
limited.    As mentioned previously tuition for students attend- 
ing universities declined greatly in real terms until it was 
an insignificant fee.     Since   these funds were previously used 
to pay expenses of the universities,deterioration of this 
source presented a serious loss of income. 
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University Income 
Income received by universities  from endowment funds was 
also reduced  in real terms.     These funds were  invested largely 
in fixed income   securities.    As mentioned in the  stock market 
section, as  inflation progressed,   the real return from fixed 
income securities was reduced.    Eventually this previously 
significant source  of income became negligible.     Thus,   two 
important sources of income  for the universities were for all 
practical purposes eliminated during inflation.     Given these 
reductions  in income,   budgets had to be reduced and conse- 
quently professors salaries had to be held down. 
The universities were given some assistance in 1920 by 
the establishment of the Emergency Society of German Learning. 
The funds provided by this  society offset some of the reduc- 
tions discussed above.     By 1922,   however,  the beneficial ef- 
fects were negated by the rapid increase in inflation. 
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Professional Hardships 
In order to offset their losses  in real  income professors 
worked additional   jobs,   normally manual labor.    When these 
sources proved   inadequate many professors were forced  to sell 
their personal  libraries and reference books.19      Although 
providing  some   needed   funds,   this was   clearly  a  desperate 
measure.    A  man can continue only so  far without the tools of 
his  trade. 
Many people  in the  educational field left their profes- 
sion altogether  for a lesser position in manual labor work. 
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Although the  pay was only slightly higher, expenses could be 
reduced in the  latter field.     Less expensive work clothes 
would be worn in labor work.    Additionally these clothes would 
not have   to be cleaned as  often.     The necessity of purchasing 
books or  journals in their field was also eliminated.     Other 
expenses necessary to keep up the prestige which was accorded 
a university professor in Germany were also avoided by taking 
197 a manual  labor   job. 
The university professor suffered hardships other than 
monetary hardships.     The tremendous increases in the cost of 
publishing made  it  impossible for most professors to publish 
their research.     Projects which were months or years in prep- 
aration now had  to be abandoned for lack of funds.     Other re- 
quirements of a university professor such as subscriptions to 
journals  in his  field and attendance of professional meetings 
were curtailed because of inflation.     Journal costs simply 
became too expensive198 and professional meetings were elim- 
inated because  of the high cost of transportation necessary 
to attend.199 
The cost of advanced education also caused a reduction 
in students who entered graduate schools  for doctorate de- 
grees.    No  longer could necessary tools and materials be 
purchased   for these advance studies.    Additionally,   the ex- 
penses of research for a dissertation and its printing and 
publishing detered many who were qualified.    Without these 
graduate students to help with the teaching load and carry on 
<* 
nith the work and teaching traditions of their professors, 
many scholars  felt that a   vital area of the university system 
.      .   200 was  lost. 
University Costs 
Funds available for library and research materials and 
equipment were  greatly reduced.    In 1922,  during a conference 
of German libraries  in Berlin,  figures were  presented which 
indicated that of sixteen of the largest German libraries, 
eight had less   than twenty-five per cent of their prewar buy- 
ing power for  their budget.     The cost of books which were al- 
ready high continued upward during the following year.     In 
September of  1922,  books were priced sixty times higher than 
before the wan   by December 1922,   they cost six hundred times 
as muchj   in February  1923.   two thousand times as much, and by 
June 1923,   four  thousand and two hundred times as much.     This 
was during a  period when  income to libraries increased very 
little.201 
Another example of the difficulties of the German librar- 
ies occurred at the University of Munich in one of their spe- 
cial area libraries. The budget for this library for the 
year was two thousand marks. At the same time the cost of an 
annual volume in one research journal was ten thousand marks. 
Research tools also became unobtainable because of price. 
Although there were some increases in the amount of money 
available for research, this in no way offset the increases in 
the cost of goods. German microscopes cost one thousand to 
202 
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fifteen hundred marks before the war.     In September 1922 they 
cost eighty to  one hundred  thousand marks,   in December 1922, 
four hundred  thousand marks, and in April 1923.   three and one- 
half to five million marks.     Obviously with a relatively fixed 
203 
budget there was no way schools could buy these items. 
Another example of the difficulties  in purchasing research 
tools can be  seen at the Emperor William Research Institute in 
the fall of  1922.     The physics department budgeted six thousand 
marks  for instruments before the war.     To buy the same amount 
in 1922 would cost 2,^00,000.m    Again no significant increas- 
es in the budget occurred to offset these price increases. 
Student Curriculum 
The economic conditions of the country caused a change 
in the  type  of curriculum chosen by students.     A much more 
practical selection was now made so as to prepare  for posi- 
tions which would be available upon their graduation.     In Ta- 
ble 10,   university enrollments in various areas of study for 
the years  1913.   1921,   1922,  and 1923 are presented.    English, 
theology,   history,   philosophy, and all sectors of Fine Arts, 
show declines  in enrollment from prewar years  to  the early 
1920-8.     Enrollments or the study of medicine also show sharp 
declines.     Germans during inflation lacked funds  to pay a 
doctor and merely postponed or did without medical care.     Phy- 
sicians  had  to sell  their equipment or take on a second   job to 
support  themselves.     Thus it is understandable why students 
avoided  medicine. 
TABLE  10 
ENROLLMENT  IN  GERMAN UNIVERSITIES 
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Protestant Theolopy 
Roman Catholic Theology 
Medicine 
Philolof^r and  History 
Pharmacy 
Law and Administration 
Dentistry 
Chemistry 
Agriculture 
Mathmatics and Natural 
History 
1913 
Summer Session 
1921    1922    1923 
4.316 3,281 2,904 
2,055 2,149 1,919 
15,461 14,712 12,746 
10,832 9,550 8,290 
1,076 848 1,073 
9,61? 19,398 20,329 
932 4,675 2,946 
888 2,832 3,529 
1,353 3.118 2,835 
6,148 6,203 5,278 
2,469 
1,824 
10,777 
7,769 
1,184 
22,127 
1,849 
3,586 
3,257 
4,887 
Source 1     Sir  Philip Dawson,  Germany's Industrial Revival 
(London,   1926),   p.   224. 
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On the other hand enrollments in the study of law and 
administration, chemistry and agriculture increased during in- 
flation.  There was a need in these areas and students wished 
to fill it. 
The   trend  toward a  selection of a more practical  career 
can be seen in the enrollment figures of technical high 
schools.     In 191^ there were  12,380 students  in these schools» 
20 5 by 1923 enrollment had  increased  to 26,181, or an increase 
of over 110 per cent.     Table  11 provides a breakdown of the 
different areas   of study  in these   technical high schools.     In- 
creases  in the   study of engineering,   electronics,   chemistry 
and mining confirm the  trend of choosing a practical occupa- 
tion. 
Inflation Profiteers 
Introduction 
As mentioned elsewhere in this paper,   farmers and cer- 
tain real estate  speculators prospered during the  inflationary 
period.     In addition to these groups,   there emerged a small 
group of businessmen who became extraordinarily wealthy. 
Historically an  increase   in the concentration of wealth and 
power  is  not  unusual   in  times   of  chaos.     The author  Schomoller 
explains  this phenomenon stating "In those periods,   the strong 
recover their primitive  habits as beast of pr#y." Pinner, 
commenting on the new German rich writes,   they "derived their 
power from the destructive  forces of their time and became 
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TABLE 11 
ENROLLMENT IN TECHNICAL HIGH SCHOOLS 
191*+ 
Summer Session 
1921 1922 1923 
Architecture 1*914 1,921 1,922 1,923 
Building Engineering 2,182 1,848 1,726 1,699 
Machinery Engineering 2,765 3,147 3.040 2,85*+ 
Electrotechnics 3.511 8,859 9,504 9,815 
Chemistrv and Mining 874 2,970 3,442 3,789 
Source 1  Sir Philip Dawson, Germany's Industrial Revival 
(London, 1926), p. 224. 
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rich not with the increase of general prosperity,  but with 
20? the increase in  the poverty of their people. 
Establishment of Fortunes 
The  fortunes made in the inflationary period were dif- 
ferent from those established in prewar Germany.     Before the 
war those who became rich were creators  of wealth.    They es- 
tablished  new managerial techniques or discovered valuable 
scientific processes. Their work was the basis of the 
rapid industrialization of the late l800's in Germany. Many 
new jobs and a subsequent increase in the German standard of 
living resulted   from their efforts. 
The inflation fortunes did not result from the creation 
of wealth. Instead they resulted from speculation and abnor- 
mal economic events resulting from the inflation. The infla- 
tion fortunes had their beginnings in various enterprises such 
as production of military goods and materials during the wan 
foreign trade which was very profitable due to government re- 
strictions on competition,   speculation in used armament mate- 
209 
rials after the warj   speculation in foreign exchange» own- 
ership of scarce materials such as  coal,   timber, and iron,  and 
liquidation or transfer of metallurgical and mining firms 
under the  terms   of the Treaty of Versailles.     The owners of 
these  firms were  generously reimbursed by the German govern- 
ment.     Prominent examples of this were the industrialists 
Stumm and  Stinnes.     Stumm was  paid  one  hundred and  twelve 
million marks by  the government.     Stinnes sold sixty per cent 
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of his  holdings  in Saar to France.     He was paid one hundred 
million gold marks for this. 
From the large sums accumulated in these various ven- 
tures,   the  profiteers were able to increase their fortunes. 
They understood  inflation best and planned their investments 
on a continuation of the  inflation.    Many opposed government 
attempts to stabilize the economy. 
Great industrial concentrations were established by 
these men.     The  low level of prices  of industrial shares al- 
lowed huge amounts of stock to be purchased with relatively 
small amounts of money.     Control of these companies was  then 
obtained.     The business of the company had little bearing on 
whether it was  suitable for purchase or not.    During the  in- 
flation the economic situation changed so rapidly that various 
industry groups would appear more attractive at one time or 
another.     Since   the profiteers were buying anything that 
looked particularly profitable,   huge groups of unrelated com- 
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panies became  connected under the direction of one man. 
The most famous inflation profiteer,   Hugo Stinnes,  was 
a sood example of this.     He owned coal,  lignite,   petroleum, 
and iron interests,  a blast furnace,   steelworks,  engineering 
firms,   electrical firms,   shipyards,   forests,   transportation 
companies,   ocean and inland shipping companies, merchant firms, 
212 
newspapers,   and   inns. 
In addition to employing their own funds for their vari- 
ous speculative activites.   the profiteers used a method that 
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was popular with all speculators during that time.    They 
would borrow as much money as they could and later pay back 
their debts  in depreciated marks.    Although interest rates 
had increased due to inflation they did not in any way com- 
pensate  for the  rapid loss of the value of the mark.    Specu- 
21 "\ lators profited greatly by these methods.   *-' 
Life Style of Profiteers 
The life style of the profiteers  contrasted greatly with 
that of the  typical German.     While the average German lived 
in poverty,   the  profiteers built mansions in which to live 
and ate,  dressed and entertained lavishly—in general,  living 
in absolute  luxury.     The profiteers were greatly condemned 
for their behavior by the great majority who had nothing. 
The stabilization ended  the speculative opportunities 
for the profiteers.     Some were overextended at that time and 
lost much of what they had acquired.    The majority, however, 
preserved their fortunes and remained wealthy. 
General Poverty 
Increase   in Crime 
In addition to the adverse effects  on the food habits, 
the health, and the education of Germans,   inflation disrupted 
many other areas of their life style.     In general,   it caused 
a great  impoverishment of the people in all areas of life. 
As an indication of this,   crime statistics grew worse as  the 
inflation increased.     Table  12 presents an index of the number 
TABLE 12 
INDEX OF THE NUMBER OF CRIMES (1822 = 100) 
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Total number of crimes 
Crimes committed by men 
Crimes committed by 
young men 
1913  1921  1923  192*4-  1925 
117 136 170 150 122 
123 137 179 158 129 
125 173 212 153 
Source*     Costantino Bresciani-Turroni,   The Economics  of 
Inflation  (London,   1931). P.   332. 
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of crimes committed for a prewar year and compares it with 
the years of inflation and post-inflation.    Crimes committed 
rose  in all three  categories,  and,   in each category,   reached 
a peak in 1923,   the last year of inflation.     The total number 
of crimes  increased forty-five per cent from 1913 to 1923. 
Crimes  committed by young men increased by seventy per cent. 
The types of  crime  that  increased in number were crimes that 
would provide additional money or goods for the criminal. 
Theft,  misappropriation of goods and illicit receiving of 
214 
goods or money all showed rapid increases during inflation. 
One   journalist reports of a sign in the great cathedral 
of Cologne stating "Beware of Pickpockets".215    It can be 
surmised that  these crimes were aggravated by the poverty in- 
flicted on the people by inflation.     The crimes were committed 
not by hardened criminals but by those who  had been forced  in- 
to desperate  circumstances.    Many of these new criminals sim- 
ply had  no other means  to keep themselves and their families 
alive.    During the same period crimes of violence such as as- 
saults and homicides decreased.     Bresciani-Turroni concludes 
that the decline  in the  consumption of alcohol was the cause 
of this.     With poverty so widespread,   the traditional heavy 
drinking of the German people was  curtailed.     He reasons that 
the fewer the number of intoxicated people,   the less the like- 
lihood of violent crime. 
After inflation ended in 1923.   the index of crimes de- 
clined rapidly.     By 1925.   the total number of crimes was down 
^ 
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twenty-eight per cent  from the  high levels of  1923•  and crimes 
committed by young men down fifty-eight per cent.     Violent 
crimes again began to rise after the inflation.    This rise co- 
incided with an increase in alcoholic consumption giving some 
credence  to  the relationship of alcoholic consumption and vio- 
violent crimes. 
In Table   13  the  increase  in crimes committed by young men 
shows a much greater rise  than the increase in total number of 
crimes.     Table   13 shows for various years the number of con- 
victed  juvenile offenders in Berlin.     During the inflationary 
period,   there was  a rapid rise  in the number of offenders. 
Eetween 1913 and   1922 the number of convictions increased by 
275 Per cent.     For the  first five months in 1923 the number 
of convictions almost equaled that of the twelve months of 
1922.2l6    This rapid increase again gives an indication of 
the consequences  of a rapid and sharp increase  in poverty. 
The young,  because  of their greater recklessness and their 
still unformed  codes of behavior would be more   inclined to be 
tempted by the advantages of theft. 
Prostitution also showed a rapid increase during the in- 
flation.217    The   lack of food and other physical comforts 
broke down the moral codes  of the population.     Many young 
women chose prostitution as a means to  improve  living condi- 
tions  for  themselves and their families. 
Pawn Shops 
Crime was but one of the methods used by the Germans to 
alleviate the   poverty they experienced.    Most of the  population 
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TABLE  13 
CONVICTED  JUVENILE  OFFENDERS  IN BERLIN 
1913 1.131 
1921 3.752 
1922 U.2^9 
192 3   (first five 3.928 
months) 
Source 1     Robert S.   Lynd,   "Papier Geld - Its Rate of Exchange 
in the Human Market," The Survey. LI   (November 1, 
1923). 1^0. 
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chose legal means.     Those who had articles of value sold what- 
ever they could.     A great number of pawn shops and similar 
stores opened  to accomodate  this business.    Furniture, art, 
and other personal  items filled these shops. 
The  small amounts received for these goods barely offset 
the resulting deterioration in living conditions caused by 
their sale.     The condition of one family was pictured as fol- 
lows i 
In two rooms up four flights of stairs a man lived 
with six children.     Two grown-up daughters received 
a weekly unemployment dole of three and one-half 
marks a'week.     Both rooms were absolutely bare,  every 
article of furniture having been sold except for one 
bed  consisting of a rickety frame with some bits of 
string tied across, and on these a bundle of rags to 
serve as a mattress.    The man seemed stupified by 
misery,   but the woman wept histerically when she 
spoke of it,  and said   she would commit suicide.^10 
The  former rich suffered similar circumstances.    The nov- 
elist,   Thomas Mann writest 
People who had once been wealthy and were still liv- 
ing in their delapidated old mansions sold  their art 
treasures and  furniture  to sharpers.    A Rembrandt 
might bring them enough to live on    or      f      weeks. 
In the  end,   they were turned out into the streets 
with their pockets full of multicolored paper.*** 
Medical   .journals were  full of advertisements for the sale 
,      , 220 
of equipment,   furniture and  clothes. 
Borrowing and Sharing 
A   great  increase  in mutual borrowing and sharing occurred 
to compensate for  shortages of necessary items that became  too 
expensive  due to  inflation.     In one report a single clothes 
line was used by several different families.    Wash day was 
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scheduled to coincide with one's day with the line.    Newspa- 
pers were also shared among families.    Clothing too was 
passed around.     One hat was used by three different women, 
all in separate  families,   for a trip to the city of Frank- 
fort.221     In some  towns,  women would take their bread to the 
bakers  to have  it baked.     Individual stoves were too expen- 
sive to operate and for a very small fee the baker would put 
222 the dough in his oven. 
When borrowing was not possible  people simply did with- 
out.     "Some of the highest aristocracy and formerly wealthy 
people stopped buying soap and newspapers.    Books were en- 
tirely out of  the question."223    Lower quality goods were 
sometimes substituted in place of goods of higher quality. 
In a hospital in Munich,   the  cheapest type of kitchen soap 
was used  in the operating room.     The  cost of antiseptic soap 
was   too  high. 
Other areas affected by inflation were charities,   divorc- 
es,   funerals,   and the moral outlook of the people.     Charitable 
institutions were adversely affected by inflation in two ways. 
First,   current gifts were reduced as  inflation progressed. 
Second,   the  real value   of their endowments declined rapidly 
as the value  of the mark dropped.     In Berlin before  the war, 
there were sixty chartities who had a combined endownment of 
fifty-six million marks.    These funds were for the most part 
invested   in stocks and bonds.     Even after the revaluation 
these assets  totaled  only a million and a half marks.     The 
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income from these assets was,   of course,   similarly reduced 
and service to the  public had  to be substantially diminished,     * 
A  great rise  in the number of pauper funerals also oc- 
curred.     Expenses of burials   couldn't be paid by many fami- 
lies and the state had to take over this task.    A relaxation 
of requirements allowing much cheaper pasteboard shells to 
be substituted for wooden coffins did little to reduce the 
O Q C. 
increasing number of pauper funerals. 
Moral Attitude 
The amount  of divorces also showed a dramatic increase 
in the   inflationary period.     Table   Ik presents the number of 
divorces and the rate per thousand population in Berlin for 
the  1913-1922 period.    As  indicated the number of divorces 
in the inflationary 1920's was more  than doubled from prewar 
amounts.     The rate of divorces also shows a startling in- 
crease.     These  figures are evidence of the destruction of 
the old mores of  the previously conservative German society. 
The attitudes of the people changed too.    A  young Ger- 
man girl in an interview with Pearl Buck talked about how in- 
flation had affected her and her formerly well-to-do family. 
While waiting in a  line for concert  tickets she reported. 
The Die was  rrowing smaller and more people wanted 
tJ'hSi:    iecesTfhe pie. and so there was no    in, 
left from the good neighbor atmosphere of former 
davs.     Even here,   in the place of high culture, 
everybody saw an enemy  in everybody else. 
The following quotation is a particularly interesting 
portion of the same interview.     It gives some insight into 
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TABLE  14 
DIVORCES  IN BERLIN 
Number of 
Year Divorces Rate/1000 
1913 17.835 26.8 
1914 17.740 26.2 
1915 10,791 15.9 
1916 10,494 15.5 
1917 11,603 17.7 
1918 13,344 20.6 
1919 22,022 35.0 
1920 36,542 59.1 
1921 39,216 62.9 
1922 36.548 59.6 
Source:     "Divorces and Suicides in Germany, " The Nation,  CXIX 
(October 15.   1924),   428. 
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the change  in moral attitude of the girl's father and his ef- 
forts to explain  to himself why his world was falling apart. 
You could go   to the baker in the morning and buy two 
rolls for twenty marks i  but go there in the afternoon, 
and the same   two rolls were twenty-five marks.    The 
baker didn't  know how it happened that the rolls were 
more expensive  in the afternoon.    His customers didn't 
know how it  happened.     It had somehow to do with the 
dollar,   somehow to do with the stock exchange-- and 
somehow,   maybe,   to do with the Jews.    Anti-Semitism 
was growing tremendously.     'Stock exchange' and   'Jews' 
were  very much connected in the minds of the people, 
and when the  anti-Semitic propaganda said,   'It is the 
Jews,'  people were ready to believe it.    Looking 
around for  the guilty ones,   in a situation which no- 
body really understood,  made those who lost their for- 
tune,   especially the middle class,   ready prey for 
anti-Semitic  propaganda. 
I gave up my  private lessons,   convinced that I  could 
not earn money by honest means.    Father began to 
speak against  the  Jews more and more. 
He used to say,   'There are  two kinds of capitali  one 
is creative  capital,   the other is parasitical.     Crea- 
tive  capital  is where a man works;  parasitical capi- 
tal  is  the capital on which a man gets interest. 
Creative  capital is  the capital we Germans have, 
parasitical capital is the capital of the Jews. 
I  thought this very silly and I said,   'Now, Father, 
where did you  pick up that theory?'     He said,     I 
bought a pamphlet on the fish market.'    It was a well- 
known pamphlet by Feder,   one of the Nazis. 
•Well.'   I  said to Father with utter contempt in my 
voice,   'since when do you pick up your ideM on the 
fish market?'     Father replied,   'Since I have *o work 
in the  fish market to earn a living for you. 
He spoke more and more at mealtimes about these  things. 
Mother sometimes said something about s^ke^ear£h
a"d 
Shylock,   and   'maybe  there  is  something in It.       TMB 
Sriews^ "AlVorTVe^edV^mlre Worried. 
becausTuntJnow I  had not heard the conception of 
lewc,  ac?   narasites.     So  I  decided  to  face  father.     1 
saTd.   "your Iheory  is really silly-eive me one proof 
of it.' 
Ill 
Father said,   'I can give you  the proof.    Where did 
I get the money for ray business—from the Jew 
Holzraanl'      'Father,'  I said,   'it was pure friend- 
ship,  and you were so happy and so thankful about 
it.'     He said,   'But now I  have to pay interest to 
him on the  gold value of the mark, while I lose 
money.     If I  have  to pay him his interest at the 
beginning of next year, as I  have to do,  I will have 
nothing left.'     'But,  Father,'  I said,   'I remember 
that you said it was  the usual way of business to 
make a gold clause  in the contract.' 
Father was getting impatient.     'But I  looked at it 
then in a different way,'   he said.     'Now I work 
hard,   get up at six o'clock in the morning and come 
home  late and where does the money go?    To the Jews I' 
I  said,   'But Mother gave you capital,   too, and don't 
you pay her interest?'    Father said,   'That has nothing 
to do with the Holzmans.' 
I thought it was   .just the same but there was no argu- 
ing with  him. 
Then I  said to Mother,   'Mother, you know the Holzmans 
are in a very difficult situation.    Mr.  Holzman is 
going to  lose  his  sight and Mrs.  Holzman is the best 
friend you ever had,   the only one who stood by you 
when we had difficult times.' 
And then Mother said to Father,   'Well,  ftUll, I think 
in this case you have gone  too far.    Maybe there  is 
something risht in what you say about the Jews,   out 
don't mention my friends Holzman in this  connection 
anymore.'228 
The father's attack on the Jews was  one way he could ex- 
plain the cause  of the   inflation.     The hardships and adversity 
of the  inflation years needed to be blamed on someone or some- 
thing.     The anti-semitic propaganda provided a target for the 
pent-up frustrations of  the Germans.    This  propaganda provided 
a base   from which the Germany of Hitler was  formed. 
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Suicides 
Suicides rose considerably during the last years of in- 
flation.  In 1922 there was a twenty per cent increase from 
229 the previous  year. 
In Berlin eleven suicides were  reported in one day.    For 
the most part  these people were older citizens who had once 
been well-to-do but had since  lost everything in the  inflation 
years.     They did not want  to be a burden to others and also 
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did not want a slow death by starvation. 
In Munich in an old people's home patients presented a 
petition requesting means to kill themselves. They too de- 
sired a quick death rather than a slow one from lack of 
food. 231 
Given the privations and suffering that these people 
lived through  in the inflation years,   it is not surprising 
that some chose to end  their lives rather than to continue 
living. 
' 
113 
CHAPTER  VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The objective of this thesis is to study the German in- 
flation of 1923 and to determine the resulting financial and 
social effects. 
In Chapter II,   the nature of inflation is briefly exam- 
ined.    Inflation has been defined as  "a tendency toward a 
continuing rise in the  general level of prices."    Although 
there is some disagreement on the desirability of a small de- 
gree of inflation,  all economists  feel a significant rise in 
prices is  harmful.    An important argument against inflation 
is that it causes  distributional effects on income and wealth. 
Those who   live on relatively fixed incomes  from savings,   pen- 
sions, or social security face increased cost for the neces- 
sities of life.     During inflation with costs increasing and 
incomes stable,   these groups must either decrease their stan- 
dard of living or depend on other sources to maintain them- 
selves.    Wealth held  in savings accounts or fixed income se- 
curities  loses  its  real value resulting in hardships for 
those who depend on their savings for retirement.    Both the 
decline in real income and the decline in real wealth ad- 
versely effect large portions of a society's population. 
These effects, while not directly measureable,  definitely de- 
crease the overall welfare of these groups. 
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The  inverse relationship between unemployment and infla- 
tion is important.     Based on the work of the British economist, 
A. //.  Phillips,   it is  theorized that when unemployment is low 
the annual increase in wage rates is relatively high, and 
when unemployment is  high,   the annual increase in wage rates 
is relatively low.     From this we can derive the relationship 
between unemployment and the inflation rate.    Because of 
this inverse relationship,   optimal levels  of unemployment and 
inflation cannot be attained at the same  time.    Since both 
factors are very important considerations  in today's society 
there is much public  debate on the relative merits of each. 
Inflation can be  typed as either demand-pull or cost- 
push and is also distinguished according to its rate of in- 
crease.    There are two main theories of inflation.    One  is 
based on Keynesian theory and the other on monetary theory. 
Keynesian theory rests on the liquidity preference function. 
This function describes  the inverse relationship between the 
quantity of money and  the interest rate.     The connection be- 
tween inflation and  the  liquidity preference function is made 
in the  investment sector of the Net National Product.     If in- 
terest rates are declining,   investment will increase.    This 
higher level of  investment will cause a multiple expansion of 
N. N.  P.     If the economy is operating at full employment,  this 
higher level of investment will cause an increase  in prices. 
The monetary theory of inflation is based on the quantity 
theory of money of which the  "equation of exchange", MV=PQ,   is 
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an essential component.     In this equation, M is the money 
supply»   V  is  the  velocity of the circulation of money,  P is 
the price level of all poods and services, and  .4 is the out- 
put of final poods and services during the  period.     If V and 
Q are held constant, M and P will be directly proportional. 
That is,   if M increases,   then P will also  increase.    Of course 
V and Q are not constant in the real world.    Derivations of 
the "equation of exchange" can be calculated to arrive at 
M=NNP(i).     This  equation exhibits a direct relationship be- 
tween M and NNP if a constant V is assumed.     V is a fairly 
stable variable,   and therefore in this equation M is a fairly 
pood predictor of NNP.     Historical examples have been studied, 
and the relationship between M and P is borne out in the ereat 
majority of cases. 
In Chapter III,   the historical period of the German in- 
flation is  examined.     This inflation had its beginnings  in 
the  days  preceding World War  I.     At  that  time,   in order  to 
halt  the  outflow  of  gold  from Germany,   the   country discontinued 
its  policy  of  redeeming  currency  for gold.     The  removal  of 
the   link between gold  reserves  and   the  amount  of money  in 
circulation was   followed by the discounting of Treasury Bills 
in huge amounts.     The discounting of Treasury Bills  increased 
the amount of money in circulation by over H3 times.     By 
the end of 1923 the velocity of circulation also increased 
greatly by almost 18 times.     Q is  estimated to have remained 
essentially stable.     The  "equation of exchange" MV=PQ.   predicts 
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a large  increase  in prices due to the large increases  in M 
and V.     The actual price  figures validate  this   equation. 
Wholesale  prices in Germany from 1913 to October 1923 rose 
18.7 billion times.    With these historical results,   it is 
concluded  that the monetarists view of the theory of infla- 
tion is valid in the inflation under consideration. 
Chapter IV relates  the events of the  topsy-turvy finan- 
cial world of the  inflation period.     The German stock market 
fluctuated violently during this period.     The overall trend 
however,  was decidedly downward with an index of stock prices 
almost eighty per cent lower at the end of 1923 than it was 
in 1913.     The German banking system, which had been the most 
powerful economic group in Germany,  was damaged more  than 
many other industries.     This occurred because the rreat amount 
of bank funds was  by necessity placed in intanrible assets 
such as   loans and currency.     These assets became  completely 
worthless during  inflation.     Bonds,   insurance policies, and 
mortgages,   because   they are valued in fixed nominal terms, 
also became  completely worthless. 
The effects  of the inflation and  its resulting condi- 
tions on the social structure of the time was equally devas- 
tating.     The continued decline in the value of the mark re- 
sulted in a  laree  decline  of  the real value of the great 
majority of Germans'   incomes and wealth.     This decline of the 
real income and wealth of such a large portion of the popula- 
tion caused much of  the social hardships  of the period.    The 
, 
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treat majority of Germans had inadequate nourishment and in- 
sufficient warmth and  clothing.     Many  hospitals  and  other 
health care  facilities were  closed.    These conditions resulted 
in an increased death rate and a declining birth rate.     Food 
shortages were acute during much of this period.    The lack of 
milk, meat,  and nourishing vegetables weakened the population 
as a whole and stunted the growth of German children.     Infla- 
tion caused severe hardships on the student and  teaching 
population.     Students were forced to take full-time   jobs and 
professors were  forced to take second jobs  to offset infla- 
tion's effects.     In contrast to the great majority of Germans, 
a small group of inflation profiteers arose and amassed great 
fortunes at this time.     They made  their money through specula- 
tive activities and at the expense of the great majority of 
suffering Germans.     Those who were not rich sold life-long 
possessions,   borrowed,  or resorted  to crime  to obtain the ne- 
cessities   of  life.     The   inflation  resulted   in many other 
changes in the German way of life and altered the social struc 
ture of the society. 
The study of the German inflation and its effects on the 
financial and social structure of the country provides a his- 
torical model which is of some validity in 1975. Germany was. 
at the beginning of the inflation a highly industrialized and 
socially advanced nation. The power of the inflation was such 
that it completely wiped out the fortunes of millions of Ger- 
mans and in doing so caused severe physical hardships for 
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them.    As a result of this,   the social habits and the mores 
of society were unfavorably altered.    Many of these hardships 
could have been avoided if a more conscientious effort had 
been made to control the financial policies of the country. 
Although an inflation of the magnitude of Germany's is not 
likely in the United States at this time,   effects similar to 
those observed  in Germany could occur in countries pursuing 
similar policies.     Even on a much smaller scale these effects 
could be disastrous  for the country and its citizens. 
The example of Germany during this period should serve 
as a warning to today's  industrialized societies.    The warn- 
ing is that rapid  inflation can be extremely disruptive,  even 
in a well-organized,   modern,   industrial economy.    Avoidance 
of rapid  inflation should be one of the important priorities 
of any government. 
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